

Globalization and Territorial Identities

Edited by

ZDRAVKO MLINAR

Professor of Sociology

Faculty of Social Sciences

University of Ljubljana

Avebury

Aldershot · Brookfield USA · Hong Kong · Singapore · Sydney

Contents

Preface	vii
1. Introduction	1
2. Individuation and globalization: the transformation of territorial social organization Zdravko Mlinar	15
3. Globalism and localism: theoretical reflections and some evidence Raimondo Strassoldo	35
4. Turbulence and sovereignty in world politics: explaining the relocation of legitimacy in the 1990s and beyond R.B.A. DiMuccio and James N. Rosenau	60
5. Local response to global intrusions Chadwick F. Alger	77
6. Multiple group loyalties and the security of political communities Henry Teune	105
7. Identity, autonomy and the ambiguity of technological development Colin H. Williams	115
8. Identification as a process: territories as an organizational or a symbolic area Bernard Poche	129
9. Interdependence, globalization and fragmentation Gilbert Larochelle	150
10. Epilogue	165
Notes on contributors	170

3 Globalism and localism: Theoretical reflections and some evidence

Raimondo Strassoldo

1. Introduction

This paper is divided into two main parts. In the first, some theoretical arguments are developed on globalism and localism (world unity and local diversity) and their dialectical nexus, in the framework of what is called post-modern society. In the second part, two packages of evidence from Northern Italy are presented. The first is an account of the sudden emergence - in the middle eighties and in the most developed part of Italy - of a strong regional political movement ("Lega Lombarda"), challenging the foundations of the centralized Nation-State. The second is a review of the results of a "localism-globalism scale", administered in a series of sociological surveys, from 1970 to 1988, in the Friuli region. In the conclusion, an attempt is made to link the empirical findings with some of the theoretical arguments, and a nod is made towards federalism, as the political doctrine aimed at a harmonious composition of the local-global antithesis.

The main substantive points of the paper are: 1) the trend toward globalization is very old; in social-ecological theory, it has long been known as "ecological expansion"; what is new is the sheer amount of power of communication (information and transport) technologies propelling it in our days; 2) however, there are two new elements in contemporary globalization processes: one is the ecological world-view, according to which humankind should unite in the effort to save the biosphere; the second is the "post-modern" aspiration to a pluralist, non-hierarchical, de-centered world-society; 3) the growth of globalism does not correlate with a corresponding decline of localism; on the contrary, many new forms of localism are cropping up. "New localism" seems an emergent feature of "postmodern society"; space and place, though transformed, are not going to disappear in the "constitution of society"; 4) the main transformation is from necessity and determinism to free-choice; space and place are going to be less relevant as constraining factors and more as objects of social processes. This is due mainly to the liberating effects of the communication technologies ("from a space of places to a space of flows"); 5) in the studied area, small-scale local community (life-world) is the most important "level of territorial attachment" (loyalty, identification, etc.); nation-state comes a distant second, while

the regional and especially the European levels are much weaker; globalism (cosmopolitanism) tends to increase with higher education, SES, urbanization, and younger age; thus suggesting an historical trend in this direction; 6) localism is based not only on traditional "Gemeinschaft" features, but also (marginally) on factors typical of modernity.

PART I: THEORETICAL REFLECTIONS

2. Globality

The awareness that the World is something "unitary" ("One World") is not new; on the contrary, it seems to be a cultural universal and a psychological necessity (see the concept of "Weltanschauung"). Primitive societies, insofar as they were isolated from other human groups and had no knowledge of them, tended to identify themselves with Mankind and their local habitat with the World. Ancient empires too pretended to be universal, and so did and do major religions. However there was and is a gap between belief and aspiration on the one hand, and reality on the other. In fact, tribal isolates, empires and religions covered mere portions of the ecumene. It was only with the European expansion in the continents and the assembling of the capitalist "world economy", from the XV century, that a real world system began to take shape, and reality began to match universalistic ideas and values.

Thus, one-world conscience and globalization are pretty old stuff. On the other hand, we are living in an era in which these processes are in many ways different. One of these differences, in the role of technology, is essentially quantitative, but so large as to become perhaps qualitative; the other two - the binding force of the ecological perspective and the aspiration to a pluralist and polycentric world system - seem quite new.

2.1. *The role of technology*

The world-wide transfer of information, mass-energy and persons has increased beyond the wildest expectations. The World-Economy developed for three centuries (1500-1800), on the age-old means of the legs (of man and animals) the sail, and printed paper. Since then, a number of completely new means have been invented, slashing by several orders of magnitude the cost and the time of communication, and at the same time releasing huge new amounts of energy for communication purposes. The question is whether in our days the "new technologies" - by which is usually meant the synthesis of information processing and information-transmitting technologies, which does not do justice to the wealth of new technologies of quite different type (Teune, 1986) - have brought forth a quantum leap, a qualitative change, in terms of socio-cultural consequences; or whether it is merely "more of the same". We tend to maintain that two real modern communication "revolutions" occurred around 1450, with the invention of the printing press and more efficient

navigation devices, and between 1840 and 1950, when a rapid sequence of inventions freed mankind from the limitations of his organic endowment and of a few other "natural" sources of energy (wind, water): train, telegraph, telephone, motorcar, radio, television and computers. What we have been witnessing since 1950 is only a phenomenal growth along established paths. But the difference between evolution and revolution, growth and development, continuity and change is largely a matter of subjective definition; there are no established criteria to test the dialectical law of "transition from quantitative to qualitative change".

2.2. *The ecological world view*

What is completely new, as a force towards the unification of the globe, is World-Ecology. Up to 1960, the world was being pulled together mainly by World-Economy, i. e. the extraction transfer, combination and consumption of natural resources. Nature was conceived often as an enemy to be conquered. Very few had foreseen that, in so doing, mankind would disrupt life-supporting equilibria and jeopardize its very existential bases. Awareness of ecological problems is something distinctly new and environmentalism is entitled, in our opinion, to be called a revolution. By its emphasis on the planetary nature of ecological interdependencies ("biosphere" the world ecosystem, "spaceship Earth", "the Gaia hypothesis"), it has contributed mightily to the spread of "one-world awareness". There is now a deep and widespread feeling of responsibility, involvement, and care towards our little blue planet, the only home of man, which gives a quite new flavor to contemporary strivings toward world unity.

2.3. *Cultural pluralism and structural polycentrism*

The third new aspect of the contemporary phase in the globalization process is harder to define. It pertains to the social, cultural and political realm, and may be defined negatively as the "Loss of the Center" or, positively, as the possibility of co-existence of an authentic, real diversity and plurality of civilizations.

The Modern World System has been structured around a core area, Europe, and its core values. Civilization and Modernization (and other such concepts, like Growth and Development) have been thinly disguised synonyms for Europeization (Westernization). The growth of world-level structures has gone hand in hand with the growth of the European, and then Western, (and/or Northern) centrality, and the peripheralization (marginalization) of other areas and cultures.

In the last decades however this process has elicited growing criticisms and reactions, both from the affected peripheries and also from intellectuals of the Center itself. We cannot analyse here the structural-cultural dynamics propelling this protest; basically, it seems to be the effect of the continuing driving force of the Christian and Enlightenment values of "liberté, égalité, fraternité", plus the more modern recognition of "equal dignity" to non-European, non-Western civilizations and, more generally, the new interest and care in the preservation of

pre-modern, pre-industrial cultures. Some of these aspirations have fuelled powerful political movements, when and where they have been able to control important resources (e.g. oil, and Islamic "fundamentalism"). Within the West, those countries formerly considered homogeneous in "race", ethnicity and culture are now being asked to accept enclaves of heterogeneous immigrant groups (not to be "melted in the pot"). They are also being asked to tolerate all sorts of sub-cultures and lifestyles formerly considered deviant with respect to some of the old "core values" (e.g. homosexuality).

The new consensus - well expressed in the manifesto of the XII World Sociological Congress in Madrid - emphasizes the possibility and desirability of basic cultural diversity within world (societal) unity. This entails a tolerance for cultural relativism. The world thus envisioned bears little resemblance to anything mankind has known until now; it is also different enough from the "modern world system" as to be considered the beginning of a new era, "post-modernism" ("postmodernity"). The sociological debate on this issue is very lively, and understandably so, given the magnitude of the (alleged) historical transition, the vague, confused and contradictory evidence available, and the scope of the moral problems it posits. Tolerance and relativism are old issues in philosophy, and it is well known that perfect tolerance implies perfect lack of moral principles, and cultural relativism easily ends up in moral nihilism. A genuinely polycultural world would be rather inhospitable, for instance, to the idea of "human rights" as codified in the UN Declaration, because these are premised on a culture-bound (Western-Christian) idea of human nature. The well-documented difficulty of making Western-type liberal-democratic systems work in non-Western cultures also bodes ill for a "post-modern" global society.

One traditional way of framing the issue is to ask whether "one can be civilized in more than one way", whether a plurality of civilizations can be woven into an authentically integrated whole (Konecny, 1962). In more sociological terms, one can ask whether shared core values are a necessary requirement of social (societal) order (integration), or whether the latter can rest on other bases, like mere communication or material interests (economy and ecology). We tend to stick to the traditional sociological thesis, that a world society, like any other society, cannot function without a set of core values. Of course the sharing of a minimum set of central values leaves ample room for the tolerance of diversity of more "peripheral", sub-cultural values, pertaining lifestyles and so on.

A further question, at a more structural level, would be whether a world system can be genuinely polycentric, or whether "centredness", centralization, is an unavoidable feature of societal systems. This has partly to do with the former problem since central values tend to be embodied in certain individuals and groups, who tend to dwell in certain places; thus spatial-territorial organization and the structure of the cultural system do mirror each other to some extent. But it also has to do with the mechanics of the communication systems, and modern communication technology seems to enlarge the possibilities for decentralization. But the issue is rather complex and controversial; it can be argued a) that spatial decentralization at

the surface (distribution and utilization of "communication" networks) is accompanied by a growing functional centralization at the core (control of know-how for production of hardware and software of the same networks); b) that the "real" centers of societal (political-economic) power are by definition better equipped to take full advantage of the communication technologies, and thus, in one way or the other, the latter will end up reinforcing the former.

In sum, contemporary (post-modern) "globalism" rejects older visions of world unity based on the spread of a single set of core values (European, Western, modern) and the dominance of a single core area (the North). It emphasizes instead the equal dignity of a wide plurality of cultures and civilizations, and enshrines cultural diversity and spatial equality (symmetry, equilibrium) as basic features of the proposed world system. But there is no guarantee that this is a possible or viable world societal system, and not merely a collection of loose, competitive, hostile subsystems, as it was in pre-modern history. In order to make such a polycentric, morally diverse system function peacefully, an extraordinary amount of human virtue and institutional ingenuity seems required.

3. Localism

One of the main "laws" of social theory, expressed in many ways by an impressive roster of authorities, is that "modernization" entails the broadening of spatial horizons, the transition from "localism to cosmopolitanism" as an aspect of the more general change from particularism to universalism; and that "progress" is accompanied by the "communication and mobiletic (Russett, 1967) revolution" and the withering away of the spatial determinants of social behavior. To structural-functional sociology, space and place are increasingly marginal variables.

Positions have changed in the last twenty years, for a number of reasons. One is the role of "structural" studies on development, which brought to the fore the importance of urban poles, the continuing dichotomy between town and country ("dual economies"), the growing opposition between "center and periphery", the persistence of old and the emergence of new regional differentiations, etc. Another source seems to be the growth of modern environmentalism, with its stress on the material, and hence also spatial, bases of social life; and the ensuing revival of the "human-ecological" approach in sociology. A further source is the involvement of sociology in the processes of spatial (architectural, urban, regional) planning and design. Finally, a new sensitivity towards the spatial dimension is also the result of developments in micro-sociological theory (symbolic interactionism, phenomenology etc.), with their emphasis on face-to-face relations, "silent" body language, concrete situations and behavior settings, etc. In the eighties, a number of theorists, such as A. Giddens, and R. Collins, drew on both the macro/structural, and micro/phenomenological approaches to build synthetic theories in which space is given back the central place it once held (Giddens, 1985; Collins, 1981).

These theoretical developments have an elective affinity with a number of phenomena occurring in contemporary societies and which often share the label of "new localism". We shall try below to sketch some of them; given the nature of the material, and the highly synthetic account, we shall not attempt to refer systematically to the wide-ranging literature behind it.

3.1 *Localism in economic development*

Homo Oeconomicus does not exist in the void, nor only in the abstract space of the market. Development depends not only on natural physical conditions, like land, raw materials and climate, but also on transport and communications infrastructures, settlement patterns, political institutions, cultural values and social relations prevailing in the specific locales. Thus even modern economies show a variety of spatial patterning. One instance are the so-called "economic islands", based on a multiplicity of small firms, growing by mitosis, flexibly linked by a variety of "externalities", deeply rooted in the local conditions, but technologically advanced and fully oriented to the world markets. This type of economic development, according to many analysts, can only be explained by the specificity of local conditions; in turn it may enhance community pride, regional identity, etc. Another, related, instance is the stress on the "certified regional origin" of products, especially of agriculture (wine, liquors, fruit, cheese, etc.), but extending also to others (shoes, garments). The national origin has been long used as a guarantee of quality, especially of industrial products: "Made in Germany" for machinery and chemicals, "Made in Japan" for electronics, "made in Italy" for fashion, etc. Now some regional chambers of commerce, at least in Italy, have established their own systems for guaranteeing, marketing and publicising worldwide the produce of their area. Finally, it can be recalled that in the competition for attracting residents and investments, the localities and regions often engage themselves in PR and advertising campaigns ("urban and regional marketing"), stressing their locational advantages-services, amenities, infrastructures, social climate ("business environment") etc. This inevitably contributes to the liveliness of at least "official", institutional, and mercantile regional identity, pride, etc. Intellectuals and believers in "authentic" identity may sneer at such "fabricated" images, but it is neither new nor *per se* objectionable that cultural values ride on material interests.

A quite different version of "new economic localism" concerns less developed regions. New doctrines of "self reliance", "self-centered development", "community development", gained popularity in the seventies as a reaction to established and largely bankrupted (literally) approaches to development in the "Third World". They stress the "de-coupling" of the "dependency" links between the poor and the advanced economies and technologies, and the full use of local potentials both in terms of natural and of human resources, for meeting basic local needs; a return to some degree of self-sufficiency and autarchy. They favor the use of "appropriate", "small-scale", "intermediate" technologies, often derived from local traditions ("ethno-technologies"). These theories are an outgrowth (and an important

component) of the ecological, populist and "nativist" doctrines of that decade, and it is not at all clear how far they have proved their use and viability in the following years. They have found some favor also in the conservative, isolationist circles of the North (the temptation of "benign neglect" of less developed countries), but, some rhetoric notwithstanding, they seem to have nowhere persuaded the elites of the poor countries, unable and unwilling to "opt out" of their links with the developed world.

3.2 *Localism in politics*

There are several arguments on the enduring importance of place in politics. At a more general level, it is hard to counter the famous dictum of Tip O'Neill, that "all politics is local politics"; at the international as well as the domestic levels it is mainly a struggle for the geographical distribution of resources. The control of territory ("der Nomos Der Erde", as Carl Schmitt (1950) put it) is still one of the central objects, as well as determinants, of political life.

At another level, electoral studies show a high degree of spatial variation, as well as of stability in time, in voting behavior; there are local traditions in voting, which endure for generations, and in some cases even centuries, however much socio-economic conditions may change; they point to underlying *longue-durée*, space-rooted structures. The "nationalization" thesis of voting behavior, according to which local variations would converge toward national averages, has been falsified again and again (Agnew, 1987). A third, enduring source of localism in politics is the persistence, at least in liberal-democratic regimes, of the principle of self-government of local communities, administrative decentralization, etc. Although the forces of centralization are ever more powerful, they meet continuing resistance - though often only rhetorical and ineffective; but the underlying values continue to be professed. A fourth factor is the growing scope of the physical, environmental planning functions of public administrations, which forces them to dedicate a fair part of their attention and activities to spatial, local problems. Finally, it has also been pointed out that common regional roots still play a role also at the higher levels of politics. It is well known that national leaders often surround themselves with "inner circles" of personal counselors drawn from their home region, as though this type of bond (in which space has a mediating role, of facilitating intimate, enduring personal bonds, developed through common early experiences in residence, school, business, profession, and often reinforced by family relations, sharing of speechforms and folkways, etc.) would provide maximum trust and loyalty.

3.3 *The revival of smaller settlements*

In most advanced countries, the secular cycle of large-city growth has subsided, and smaller towns (within metropolitan regions) are experiencing a healthy growth trend. This is connected to the increasing dis-amenities of big-city life (pollution, crime, overcrowding, etc.), the reduction of distances caused by communications

technologies, and the changing patterns of work. A growing number of people can enjoy the advantages of small-town and rural life, without giving up the advantages of metropolitan jobs and services. These "exurbanites" often become strongly protective of their newly-found locale, fight to preserve its local flavor, and promote a revival in community-feelings.

3.4. *Ethnic-regional movements*

One of the biggest surprises of the sixties and seventies has been the revival of ethnic-regional- (micro)national consciousness within some of the oldest, and most advanced, national societies. The Quebecois separatist movement in Canada, Scottish and Welsh nationalism in the United Kingdom, Celtic revival in Brittany, Catalanian nationalism in Spain, Occitan movements in Southern France, Friisian identity in the Low Countries and northern Germany, Sardinian and Friulian regional movements in Italy, etc. are just a few examples. In Eastern Europe, ethnic-regional and national differences, far from melting in the class-internationalism and the socialist melting pot, seem to have been exacerbated and now appear as the most explosive problem in the area. Here as elsewhere, however, it is difficult to distinguish the "level" of the claim. Much of the struggle in this field concerns precisely the self- and hetero- definition of a collectivity as a "people" "race" "minority" "nationality" "nation" "language group" "ethnic group" "regional group", etc., because legal and political claims are variously attached to each of them.

In the US, ethnic groups have not (yet?) managed to "spatialize" their claims, to identify themselves with particular regions; due partly to the exceptionally high mobility of the US population. But some districts and areas are getting more and more ethnically "colored", and bilingualism (still unofficial) is spreading in some areas; so that ethnic regionalism is a distinct possibility in the US too.

The persistence or resurgence of ethnic-regional differentiation is a highly diversified and complex phenomenon, and in the past three decades several sociological interpretations have been advanced. Some of the most popular relate it with socio-economic dynamics (the "internal colonialism" thesis); others see it as a displacement of the revolutionary spirit; and so on. In most advanced countries, regional-ethnic differences - at least at "folkloric" levels - are cultivated and emphasized also for political reasons (enhancement of loyalty and participation) and economic ones (as we have seen above).

Ethnic-regional movements, at least in Western Europe, do not necessarily have a closed, inward- and backward-looking, parochial outlook. One of their aims is to translate traditional cultural forms into modern media of expression. They do not reject modern society, but try to select and adapt what is valuable in the old culture; therefore they are often actively engaged in the invention of cultural innovations. Among their leaders, one often finds younger intellectuals, well acquainted with the latest fashions in the arts, as well as in the technologies. This is what makes "modern" ethnic-regional movements distinct from the "old", merely conservative, ones.

They are not isolated either. They link up across boundaries, hold international meetings, build coordinating bodies and federations, so that at least in Europe one may speak of a "trans-national ethnic-regional movement". They actively lobby the European institutions (Council of Europe, European Community) who have promptly seized the issue, because of its clear implications for the "softening" of the rigid structures of centralistic nation-states. A federalist "Europe of the Regions" is a basic official goal of many Western European ethnic-regional movements.

Whatever the factual weight of these phenomena (and there are grounds to believe they are rather light: their heydays were in the sixties and seventies; the eighties seem to have witnessed a decline in their momentum, at least in most western-European countries) they are certainly among the clearest evidence in favor of the individuation-globalization (in this case, regionalization-europeization)nexus.

3.5. *Environmental movements*

We have already seen that ecological consciousness is a force toward globalism. But here it must be stressed that it is also, at the same time, a force toward localism. Usually, concern and mobilization in this field start from very local, "backyard" problems. Throughout industrial societies, in thousands and thousands of cases, people unite at the grassroot level to defend their drinking water, their air, their landscape, the quality of their neighborhoods and regions. Almost automatically, however, local environmental movements become vehicles for the spread of global ecological conscience. It is obvious even to children that air, water and life-forms found in one particular place are but cross-sections of world-wide flows; that what we breathe depends on the workings of the tropical rain forests, that our woods die because of far-away industrial fumes, etc. The double bind of the ecological movements is perfectly expressed by their widespread slogan, "think globally, act locally".

It is common for environmental movements to coalesce with ethnic-regional ones, since in many countries the environment comprises both natural and man-made features; the defense of the natural environment cannot easily be set apart from the defense of the cultural landscape.

The attribution of a collective name, "new localism", to these apparently disparate (but, as we have seen, in many ways linked) phenomena implies that they can be subsumed under a common theory. Perhaps the simpler way to express it is that they manifest the transformations in the "social nature of space". In modern conditions, structured mainly by communication technologies, space has indeed lost many of its old functions in the organization of society, but has acquired new ones. The roles of space have deeply changed ("from the space of places to the space of flows") but have not dissolved. Some spatial constraints have disappeared, and man is now more free to structure space according to his own whims and needs; but this makes space even more an object of conscious choice and discussion, private as well as public. More than ever, space has become a social problem.

4. Globalism, localism, and post-modern society

It is maintained that localism and globalism (individuation and globalization) grow simultaneously because they are really not opposites, but dialectically linked. An alternative explanation may be that they both grow at the expense of a third party. This is - according to such a view - the old model of Society, identified with the Nation-State. This identification, long taken for granted in modern sociology, as well as in most common discourse, is now subject to growing criticism, both for conceptual theoretical and for empirical-historical reasons. There is a growing consensus that the Nation State is in "crisis", and that its decline as the main level of social organization is a component (cause and effect) of a larger crisis, that of Modernity (modern society), which, in turn, is correlated with the contemporary technological and economic triumphs. According to some theorists, we are living in an epochal transition from Modernity to Post-Modernity. The theory of post-modernism has been developed - so far, mainly at the "micro" level (individual consciousness and everyday life) - but it is not difficult to see its "structural", "macro", correlates, and some of them are actually being developed by scholars of political science and international relations.

Modern society, as we have known it for a few centuries, was based on 1) emphasis on instrumental rationality; 2) economicism (emphasis on "material" values of production and consumption); 3) "nationalization", i.e. concentration of social power in the hands of the Nation State, marked by centralization, hierarchization, drive for internal cultural homogeneity, maximum differentiation from other Nation States, strict control of boundaries, "totipotency" (or autarchy), ability to defend its independence by military force ("sovereignty"), etc. Now, so the theory runs, the very success of that system has generated its own contradictions, and unleashed its antithetic forces. Of course, the theory takes into account mainly phenomena occurring in the most advanced parts of the world.

Instrumental rationality has created a scientific-technological industrial system able to produce unlimited amounts of goods and to satisfy all basic material needs, so that it is now no longer necessary to focus all activities on "getting a living"; now it is possible to liberate other human faculties, e.g. capacity for enjoyment, emotions, altruism, phantasies, solidarity with nature. That the very success of rationalization would open the gates for a new wave of sensualism, emotionalism and irrationality, and that the bourgeois-capitalist system would be contradicted and betrayed by its scions, is a rather old sociological observation: it runs from Weber to Mannheim through Sorokin and Schumpeter to Marcuse to Bell, (just to drop a few names).

Also, the success of the Nation-States has created the conditions for their own decline ("nothing fails like success"). States became so overwhelming on peoples' minds as to induce them to die by the tens of millions in the name of the Nation; eventually, this caused a moral revulsion against "ethical" nationalism. But the nation state is also losing its capability to provide basic services, to perform its traditional functions. With the development of the air force and the nuclear-missile complex, the

state ceased to guarantee the physical survival of people within its boundaries. The nation-states have also lost some of their powers in the economic spheres, with the internationalization of economies, the growth of multi-national corporations, etc. In cases where they are unable to provide the expected amount of goods and services (economic failure) nationstates can easily suffer loss of loyalty (Teune, 1990). With the dramatic growth of electronic communications, states have almost completely lost their control of the flows of information reaching their citizens. The importance of this loss can hardly be exaggerated; we would argue that the most powerful single factor behind the dramatic collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe was television, through which some very attractive features of the West had become quite familiar to the "socialist" masses. The improvement of the educational level of the citizenry, in order to provide the skills required by a modern industrial society, has also made it more difficult for central governments to exert hierarchical controls and to maintain legitimacy (Rosenau, 1990).

Thus, while established Nation-States formally still occupy the center stage in the political arena - both domestic and international - they have generally lost their hold on their citizens' hearts as well as in some of the basic social processes. Portions of power are leaving the national centers and moving "upward" and "sideways"; the weakening of national centers also encourages claims for devolution "downwards", toward sectoral, regional and local levels. Crises of authority, of legitimacy, are common features of nation-states in late-modern, or perhaps already post-modern, society.

From the micro (subjective, psychological) point of view, the basic fact is the huge increase of information available to the individual. The "communication revolution" gives him access to persons, things, places or events regardless (almost) of physical distance. Individuals are free to build relations and communities across space, throwing into disarray the old hierarchical order of local communities. They can belong to a growing, almost unlimited number of "social circles", which is a basic condition for individuation. They are free (with all the necessary qualifications) to choose from among a wide range of information sources, and can structure their own information environment; which allows for a (potential) further increase in individual differentiation, to the limits where the individual is so thinly extended as to break up into pieces. Communication and information can be so abundant as to lose their original instrumental functions; post-modern man is characterized by his playful, random, aimless use of the information and communication resources. In the extreme case, they become ends in themselves, and the prospect of the "disappearance of the subject" and the "end of man", wholly melted in the flow of information through him, is a favourite theme of post-modern theorists. This also reminds us that excessive focus on the individual subject can vaporize it.

But there are also less exotic, negative sides of the situation. To begin with, the information supplied by the communication industry is inevitably partial, selected, and follows its own rules: fears of conditioning and feelings of manipulation are widespread. The fact that the media still command a surprisingly high level of popular trust, according to most studies, only compounds the anxiety of

some social critics. Its very quantity easily results in confusion, overload, stress, and rejection. People are bombarded by an excess of disordered messages, and the overall image of the world often is one of threatening chaos. Secondly, freedom is not an unqualified boon. It requires decisions taken in uncertainty; it can be psychologically tiring and demanding; it can lead to random, chaotic behavior, to loss of identity, and to flight reactions (Fromm). People also need the security and comforts (Burke's "resting places") of an external constraining moral order, familiar customs, trustworthy authority.

Finally, the world of electronics and print may well be highly diversified, and pointing to growing "customization" and individuation; they can well be banded to enhance the vitality of local, regional and minority cultures. The overall impression remains one of an essential difference between that "virtual" world and the one that results from face-to-face interactions and conversations, from the bodily, sensory experience of people, things and places. The electronic media operate, basically, at a level different from everyday life; they bear the mark (on their hardware, as well as in their contents) of the national and transnational society, and thus belong to "large scale society", with its inevitable connotations of massification, homogenization etc. (this applies much less, of course, to some newer technologies, like the telefax, the videocam, etc.)

Post-modern society, like all antitheses, in part brings to the extremes some of the trends of the preceding one, and in part represents a reaction to it. Cultural pluralism, polycentrism and localism seem to belong to the latter category. Post-modernism is marked, among other things, by the rejection of the value of uniformity (equality, homogeneity) which characterizes the old thinking and which descends from the requirements of the rule of law, of bureaucracy and of mass production. Instead, it extols the values of diversity and multiplicity, which are characteristic of ecological thinking.

Post-modernism is characterised, further, by the loss or rejection of the one, necessary, and transcendent Center - be it God, the Nation-State, or any other value; perhaps, even Man, substituted by a supermarket surfeit of arbitrary, contingent, fluid, multiple centers.

Post-modernism is also marked by a revival of localism. Localism represents one of the possible ways out of anomie, alienation and identity loss, typical of modernity. The New Localism is the search for a refuge from the unsettling confusion of the larger world. Modern man/woman has created a global system, which has many advantages and values but which is certainly too complex to survey and manage, even though only intellectually. Post-modern man/woman, just because he/she is so deeply embedded in global information flows, may feel the need to revive small enclaves of familiarity, intimacy, security, intelligibility, organic-sensuous interaction, in which to mirror him/herself, contrary to the process occurring in front of the subjectivity-effacing TV screen. The possibility of being exposed, through modern communication technology, to the whole infinity of places, persons, things, ideas, makes it all the more necessary to have, as a compensation, a center in which to cultivate one's self. The easy access of the whole world, with just a

little time and money, gives new meaning to the need of a subjective center - a home, a community, a locale - from which to move and to which to return and rest.

Traditionally, localism and rootedness have been considered backward, if not reactionary, attitudes, since history seemed to unfold towards cosmopolitanism, universalism, and mobility.

Territorial *Gemeinschaft* seemed bound to be destroyed by functional *Gesellschaft*. This has happened to some extent, but the trend could not run full course. It has found inner limits in some basic human needs, and it has generated dialectically its own limiting contradictions and countervailing forces.

Of course, as the qualifiers make clear, neo-localism is different from old localism. The essential differences are two. The first is that while old localism was "primordial", unthinking, the new one is the outcome of free will, conscious choice; the former is "necessary and natural", the second voluntary and intentional (rational). The second difference is that the old localism tended to minimize contacts with the exterior, to maintain a strong closed boundary, while the new localism is quite aware of the rest of the world, and is quite open to interactions with it.

PART II: SOME EMPIRICAL MATERIALS

5. Regionalism in Italy: the Lega Lombarda

According to most usual socio-economic indicators, Italy is a modern society; it vies with the United Kingdom in industrial output and living standards. Like most countries, it shows strong regional variations, especially along the North-South axis. The traditional dichotomy between the Mezzogiorno and the North seems to be widening, at least at the structural-economic level. More recently, a three-fold partition has been suggested, with the growth of a "third Italy" comprising the North-East and some central areas, marked by a diffuse network of small and medium industries.

It is not easy to assess the extent to which "objective" regional variations in geographical conditions, in historical experience, in culture (values, language, style of life), in productive structures, translate into feelings of regional identities in Italy. After national unity (1860), the State was set up along strictly centralistic lines, and regional differentiations were officially negated; every effort was made to build a common national identity. After the fall of Fascism, regionalist political doctrines re-emerged, and 19 regions were granted some degree of administrative autonomy (1948 Constitution). Five of them were peripheral regions, marked by special problems (insularity or presence of national minorities) and these were given special, broader autonomy: Sicily, Sardinia, Valle d'Aosta, Trentino-South Tyrol, and Friuli-Venezia Giulia. The former four were set up even before the 1948 Republican Constitution; the last only in 1963. The other, "normal" regions, were instituted in 1971. This staggering fact indicates how hard it was to turn the old centralistic state

into a regional one; and the difficulties are still by no means over. In the eighties, many political observers saw a tendency of the Central State to undermine regional autonomies and reclaim its powers.

For a long time, regional variations had no political meaning and little cultural legitimacy. They were relegated to the low-brow level of dialects, jokes and prejudices. With the strong immigration waves from the South to the North-West, in the fifties and sixties, some manifestations of ethnic prejudice and "racism" emerged; but the issue was not taken seriously. Very few sociological studies on ethnic-regional relations have ever been done in Italy. Regional variations were considered a matter for ethnologists and anthropologists, i. e. scholars of premodern societies. It was assumed that they would wither away with modernization and "progress".

Such phenomena were considered more important in the frontier areas, where historical ties with the entities beyond the border, cultural affinity, presence of minorities and claims for autonomy were more significant. And it is in such areas that some scholarly interest in these issues emerged, and a small tradition of regional-ethnic studies was built in the seventies and eighties.

In Italy, regional identity feelings translated into political movements and organizations only in a few cases. In Sicily during the Allied occupation (liberation) and immediately thereafter, a separatist movement arose; it had murky ideological bases, and was short-lived. Since the setting up of the regional autonomous government, there have been no talks of a "Sicilian autonomist movement". By contrast however, separatism in Sardinia - which always housed a "Sardinian Action Party" - has been at times fairly strong; and even more so in the Valle d'Aosta, whose Union Valdotaïne has always been the ruling party. The Region Trentino-South Tyrol has been practically split in two. In South Tyrol, the local regional party (Südtiroler Volkspartei) dominates political-administrative life, and the Province enjoys a large degree of autonomy. The Trentino question is less linear. Its autonomist movement was rather strong at the end of the war, but was subsequently mostly swallowed up by the Christian Democratic party. It lingered on for thirty years, and more recently seems to have partly contributed to the success of the Green party.

Likewise, in Friuli-Venezia Giulia one has to distinguish the two parts of the region. Venezia Giulia is the Trieste metropolitan area, characterized by a sizeable Slovene minority, which is of the "national", and not merely "ethnic-regional" type.

Friuli has long nurtured a cultural-historical identity, but only after 1945 was this translated into political terms. The inclusion of Friuli among the "Special Autonomy Regions" was bitterly fought, also by the local power elite, fearful of any "separatist" tendency. This also helps to explain the 15-year lag between formal institution and factual implementation. The autonomist feeling was very weak, and limited to a handful of lay and priestly intellectuals. With the setting up of the regional institutions, the ethnic-regional awareness suddenly exploded: a Movimento Friuli was founded in 1964, which at the 1968 elections won 12 % of the vote. It became a significant political force, but after a few years it began to decline; in the eighties it was reduced to about 3 %, and in the nineties dissolved.

The example of Friuli was probably not without significance for the neighboring, much larger Veneto. In the seventies, the Liga Veneta (Venetian League) was founded. While the issues on which the Movimento Friuli built its success were mostly of the economic type (the familiar "internal colonialism" argument: Hechter, 1975), it seems that the main motivation of the Liga Veneta is the threat to local culture and way of life posed by recent immigration from the South, especially in the public service sector. One of the more characteristic rally cries of the Liga has been "Fuori i terroni" - "Southerners go home".

6. The "Lega Lombarda"

Finally, in the eighties the mighty Lombards got the ethnic-regional message. In the most prosperous, well-organized, orderly, and modern province of the whole country - bordering on Switzerland, engaged in internationally-oriented industrial and service production - a mass ethnic-regional movement suddenly exploded, the Lega Lombarda. In the 1990 municipal elections, it ravaged all "national" parties, reaching an average of 18-20 % in many provinces, and even the relative majority in many townships. In the 1992 elections, having changed its name to Lega Nord (Northern League), it skyrocketed to 25-30 % in Lombardy and caused landlides also in neighboring Piemonte and Veneto, where it became, in many areas, the second largest party. At the national level, with 9 % of the vote, it ranks only in fourth place (after the Christian Democratic party, the Socialists and the ex-Communists, newly renamed Party of the Democratic Left), because the Center and the South stuck to traditional voting patterns.

The Lega Lombarda has also shattered most socio-political theories on the "stability" of the Italian electorate, and has caught social scientists quite unprepared. A spate of instant-researches on the phenomenon has been contracted out, and some longer-term and more systematic studies on motivations, ideology, expectations, social position, political origin, etc. of the Lega supporters are under way (Mannheimer, 1991). The most frequently cited factors are the following (not necessarily in order of importance):

- a) the hostility towards Southerners, especially because of (fears of) the encroachment of organised crime (Mafia, Camorra, N'drangheta). In particular the "kidnapping industry", based in Calabria and Sardinia, has struck hard in the North, causing a veritable wave of resentment against Southerners. In more recent times, however, the Liga has officially muffled these feelings, and vigorously rejects charges of xenophobia or "racism"; to some extent, these feelings have been re-targeted against Third World immigrants;
- b) the hostility towards the Central State, seen as fiscally oppressive, arrogant, corrupt and inefficient. Some observers emphasize this anti-statist motive, and see the Lega essentially as a fiscal revolt, an expression of the dissatisfaction of autonomous workers and small businessmen with the stifling bureaucracy and bad

public services; others stress the coincidence of anti-South and anti-State animosity, since the Italian State is manned disproportionately by Southerners (up to 80 %, by some accounts);

c) the aspiration to more effective self-government, especially with regard to financial matters (fiscal and investment policies); there is a widespread feeling in Lombardy and the North generally of being bled in order to support the Roman parasitic bureaucracy and the Mezzogiorno waste;

d) the impatience (certainly not peculiar to Lombardy) with the somewhat Byzantine practices of a seemingly unreformable system of parties, centered in the national capital and thus often sneered at as "Roman Parties";

e) the dissolution of the moral grip of the two main national church-parties, the Christian Democrats and the Communists. Their ideological "raison d'être" slowly eroded by the secularization of society, on one side, and the withering away of revolutionary, millenaristic expectations on the other. The PCI (now PDS) has long ceased to appear as a threat; correspondingly, the Christian Democratic party has also lost its credibility as the "dam" and "shield" against Communism. Thus, other grounds for political action and conflict were free to emerge.

It is unclear whether the Lega Lombarda can be called a localistic and/or an ethnic-regional movement. One reason for the difficulty is the speed of change both in the real composition of the movement and of its official ideology. Undoubtedly it began, in the late seventies, as an ethnic-regional movement, after the pattern of the Lega Veneta. But its promotion of a Lombard identity and conscience has met with several difficulties, among which is the lack of a common linguistic code (Lombardy is a hodge-podge of widely different dialects). The concept of a "Lombard nation" failed to be taken seriously. Thus, in a second stage (ca. 1985) the Lega dropped such "vernacular-folkloric" objectives; thereby ceasing, we would say, to qualify as an ethnic-regional movement. It began to talk in more politico-economic terms, stressing the commonality of concrete interests of the whole of Northern Italy. Its leadership was acknowledged by other ethnic-regional movements in that area, coalitions were formed, and the Lega Lombarda effectively became the Lega Nord. At this stage, the startling proposal was made (ca. 1990) of splitting up latitudinally the Italian unitary state into three federate republics, North, Center and South. It met with some cries of horror and even charges of high treason, but also with extensive scepticism. Presently (1992) the Lega seems bent on becoming, first of all, a nation-wide force intent on capturing the national power center in order to reform from there the whole of the Italian system. The energy and efficiency with which this goal is being pursued is one of the reasons for the huge success of the Lega; but it may weaken its original, local-ethnic roots and transform it into another nation-wide party. It is not difficult to imagine that, as the Lega representatives in Rome become increasingly involved in political bargaining with the System, and work to reform the Italian State, their followers should become impatient and fall back on local, short term, emotional, maybe even

ethnic-regional issues. Because, as some pieces of research show, the objective defining feature of the Lega electorate is indeed localism (Mannheimer 1991).

But there is also a second feature, which is perhaps more ideological, but which is stressed almost obsessively in Lega rhetoric: the appeal to Europe. According to the Lega, Northern Italy is already a fully European (Central European) area, in economic, social, and cultural terms; but it is weighed down towards the Mediterranean and the Third World. Northern Italy is ready to meet the requirements of the European Unity act, and the deadline of Dec. 31, 1992; it will not tolerate the thought of missing the "European train" because of the inefficiency and backwardness of the Center-South. This is the main argument for the "secession" hypothesis. Thus, integration into a larger whole becomes a possible cause of the disintegration of lesser systems.

The Lega Lombarda/Nord may be only a passing historical contingency, or it may take root and stabilize as one of the many small and ineffective ethnic-regional parties which dot the voking maps of the Italian nation, as well as those of other nations. Or it may be able to develop into a fully-fledged national party of significant dimensions, thus gaining the ability to deeply transform the Italian system. Nobody knows yet.

As a social phenomenon, at any rate, it seems to bear out nicely some of the theories on the relations between localism and globalism, (regionalism and Europeanism), in the framework of advanced (post modern?) societies, as sketched above.

7. The localism-cosmopolitanism scale: applications in Friuli

Empirical sociologists have sometimes tried to measure the position of individuals on a localism-cosmopolitanism scale. This is not exactly the same as the localism-globalism dimension - since cosmopolitanism, like universalism, has more a moral, cultural-substantive meaning than a spatial one - but it seems close enough. One such scale asks respondents to state their "attachment" or "feeling of belonging" (membership, loyalty, etc.) to several levels of "socio-spatial organization", ranging from the neighborhood (village) to commune, province (district, county), (sub-national) region (state, in federal politics), nation-state (federal state), continent (international region) civilization ("block"), and the world (mankind). As is the case with most sociological scales, this too presents many problems. The main change it elicits is that responses cannot avoid being highly context-dependent. People feel more attached to one or the other level according to the situation in which they find themselves when the issue arises. It is common knowledge that when a person is abroad, he identifies himself more readily as a national (citizen of his nation-state), while when "at home", he may feel more strongly his regional or local loyalty. Another difficulty is the different meaning (content) of terms like "attachment" "belonging", "identity" and others, commonly used to describe the relationship between the individual and "place". Such psychological relationships are indeed

complex and volatile, and the semantics of the scale may massively influence the answers. But this is inevitable in all attempts to measure attitudes. Much truth must be attributed to the statement that what counts is behavior, and not attitude, and that the correlation between the two may be rather low. However, this is the predicament of most sociological surveys.

In a series of studies spanning almost twenty years (1972-1988), a localism-globalism scale (with very slight changes in wording and in responding techniques) was administered to samples in North-Eastern Italy (Friuli). The overall results are shown in fig. 1. For more information on the studies, see the Appendix.

The main comments, taking into account also the variables and associations which are not shown in the figure and cannot be presented here because of space limitations, are as follows:

7.1 People "feel attached" ("report to belong", "identify with", "are loyal to", etc.) mainly to the smaller-scale locales: the neighborhood (in cities), the hamlet or village (in rural areas), the township or commune (on the average, amounting to a few thousand people). The term however poses a difficulty, because it is more an organizational-administrative than a spatial entity. The second main locus of attachment, much weaker than the first, is the nation-state. The intermediate levels ("district", province, region, sub-national area) and the supra-national levels (Europe, the World) attract weaker feelings. It seems that people feel attached above all to the primordial "life-world" of everyday life, the place where they have their homes, property, jobs, primary relations, service structures and infrastructures. But they are also much influenced by the most powerful element of the system in which they are embedded - the Nation State - loyalty to which is the goal of much institutional effort, beginning with the school.

7.2 In all cases, Europe kindles weaker feelings than the State and the World. It appears that there is no smooth progress in the broadening of horizons. People jump directly from national attachments to cosmopolitanism-universalism, which appears to be, as indicated above, a moral rather than a spatial category; it appears to be the negation of any territorial attachment whatsoever, a declaration of "world-citizenship", of lack of roots, of readiness to move, of refusal to accept the partition of mankind, etc. In spite of all the historical links of Friuli to Europe (migration, business, etc.), the efforts of European Institutions, and the rhetoric of Europeanism (very strong in Italy), Europe has a very weak place on the mental horizon of the respondents.

7.3 The levels between the local (neighborhood, village, township) and the national have variable positions in the different pieces of research. The Region comes out badly in the older research, but fares far better in some of the more recent. This may be evidence of the strengthening of the administrative region (only nine years old when the first survey was done) in the consciousness of people, and/or of the (relative) weakness of the merely cultural-historical regional entity.

7.4 In all cases "Northern Italy" gets a very low score. At the time of the surveys, there was not much popular support for a "Republic of Northern Italy", as proposed by the Lega Lombarda.




Figure 1 Attachment to levels of territorial organization in six studies in the Friuli-V.G. region, 1971-1988 (see notes)

7.5 While most studies yield rather similar patterns, two of them diverge widely. In both cases, the difference may be easily explained by contextual, ad-hoc factors. In the 1972 survey, the Nation State (Italy) scored very high. That survey concerned the problems of "living at the border", and many of the questions concerned the past difficulties between Italy and neighboring Yugoslavia, the problem of the Slovene minority, the role of armed forces and border militia, and so on. Thus the focus was very much on state-level problems, and it is reasonable to think that the respondents' minds were also focused on the positive role of the Nation State in embodying basic cultural values, warranting security, etc.

The 1988 survey also shows a prevalence of attachment to the Nation State, but also - at exactly the same level - to the region, Europe and the World. Here too the focus of the whole survey - a pre-election study of political perceptions, attitudes, values, opinions, party alignments etc. - was on regional, national and international problems. No mention was made of strictly local, everyday issues. Little wonder then that the higher spatial levels of social life loomed large.

7.6 Medium-low levels, like the "area" and the "province", always get very low marks. This is understandable, since the former have no relevant administrative structure in Friuli (although they may have some socio-cultural and historical existence, especially in the mountain valleys) and the latter, though historically well-established, has few and rather marginal administrative functions.

7.7 There are marked sub-regional variations in the results. Urban areas are much more cosmopolitan than rural, and especially mountain communities. People from the Eastern part of the region (Venezia Giulia) are more nationalistic and cosmopolitan than people from Friuli, who tend favour the local and the regional levels.

7.8 Such "ecological" differences are in large part explained by differences in education (number of years in school), which can be taken as a good indicator of socio-economic status. More educated people have broader mental horizons (systems of spatial reference) than the others.

7.9 Gender differences are not very prominent. Females, who generally have lower education, have a rather narrower breadth of horizon.

7.10 Age makes a strong difference. Younger people have markedly broader horizons than their elders. Age is highly correlated with longer schooling, so that it may be assumed that this is, again, the relevant factor; but statistical tests show that it has an influence of its own may; so other age-related factors have to be invoked. An obvious one is the shorter span of time passed in the place: as many studies have shown, length of residence is strongly correlated with local attachment. If this is the case, generational patterns of territorial identification could be stable across time: as each younger generation grows older, it becomes more "rooted". This runs counter to the theory according to which cosmopolitanism-globalism is a characteristic of the present historical context, and the generations on which it is imprinted would bear on these cultural orientations in their future course. The evidence discussed here does not allow the testing of these theses, although other sources of data would tempt one to favor the latter. One clue is that localism is very much stronger in small mountain

settlements than in urban areas; and urbanization can be taken as a good indicator of the complex set of variables that can be also called modernization.

7.11 Experiences of migration for work in other countries does not appreciably improve one's position on the cosmopolitanism scale.

7.12 Evidence from one of the surveys (1985) indicates that localism is associated with: 1) (low) degree of knowledge of other Italian regions; 2) length of stay; 3) spatial extension of the primary relations network; 4) overall characteristic of the community: localism is stronger in the mountains and the rural plains, much weaker in the coastal areas and in the city; 5) degree of residential satisfaction; 6) type of attachment: the "existential-biological" one produces smaller areas of attachment, while other types of attachment fail to show this association.

7.13 The 1985 study suggests that there are different "types" of "territorial attachment" (which is something very close to localism, even though not wholly coincident), in terms of "motivation". The more common is, of course, the "primordial" or "existential" type, based on birth and upbringing in the place, having there one's family network, etc. The second is "attachment because of social integration" (feeling to be a person in a community, having friends and colleagues, feeling useful to the community, etc.). A third type of attachment, much less common, refers primarily to the qualities of the physical environment (beauty of landscape and townscape, good climate, etc.). Finally there are some who explain their local attachment in terms of pride in the "image of progress and modernity" beaconned by their community.

7.14 Evidence from another of the surveys (1988) indicates that cosmopolitanism/globalism is also associated with higher income, reading of national instead of regional dailies, higher interest in politics, leftist leanings, and even more with support for the Communist party (as it was then known) and for the Greens. But also the conservatives ("neo-Fascists"), with their strong emphasis on the Nation-State, raise their position on the scale. On the contrary, localism is associated with votes for the ethnic-regional party ("Movimento Friuli") and the Christian Democratic party.

8. Summary and discussion

As usual in sociology, our empirical research raises more questions than it settles. The somewhat different techniques by which the localism measures were presented, the differences in sample designs and, more crucially, in our opinion, the different "universes of discourse" (context of research issues and "problem-areas") in which they were presented, prevents the "longitudinal" use of the evidence. In other words, it is impossible to extract from our evidence an answer to the crucial question: is localism declining, as conventional wisdom maintains?

Other answers are more clear-cut. First, also in a modern (or at least a recently modernized) society, as the one we have studied, the absolute level of localism - in factual-behavioural terms - of common people is very high: almost 70 % have been

born in the same commune as their fathers; almost 60 % live in the same commune in which they born; the mean length of residence in the same place is 30 years (the average age of the sample, in the 1985 and 1988 studies, is 42 years); the mean radius of the area where family members were born or live in is between 3 and 9 kilometers; and the mean radius of mobility for work, shopping, services, etc. does not exceed 30 kilometers. Secondly, also the attitudinal (verbally reported) levels of localism ("how much do you feel attached to your locale") is also very high. Thirdly, it is also clear that localism is more a moral-social than a spatial phenomenon: people are attached to place because it is the locus of their existential, primordial, family relations. The locale is basically the life-world, the primary community. However, it is interesting to note that a minority stresses the physical aspects (landscape, environment) as the relevant motives for their attachment; this points to the "ecological" roots of localism, old or new.

Spatial mobility, *per se*, does not appreciably increase the levels of localism, especially if it is related to work reasons. People who had fairly long experience abroad as migrant workers are no less localistic than the others.

Fourthly, it is also interesting to note that there is a type of local attachment which is based on pride in the "progressive and modern" character of one's locale. This means that localism need not be limited to traditional societies and communities, and based on features as history, speeches, folkways, etc. This suggests that it can also survive - to some extent, and certainly with somewhat different contents - in modern societies.

The studies reviewed above do not, for instance, address the issue of the possibility of a positive correlation between localism and cosmopolitanism. It is clear that some places base at least part of their fascination on their cosmopolitan character - their being world capitals, or tourist landmarks drawing visitors from all over the world, their cultural pluralism, their ethnic heterogeneity etc. The case of the Big Apple comes readily to mind. And it seems also clear that such characters foster pride and attachment in their inhabitants, and thus some sort of localism.

The same can be said, perhaps, of towns and regions that find themselves at the crossroads between different cultural and political areas. There are many such locales, along the frontiers of continental European states, that emphasize their functions as "bridges" and meeting places. A veritable "ideology of frontier regions" has been developed. It is reasonable to think - although here we can present no hard evidence - that this can be a source of community pride and attachment, and therefore of a new sort of localism. In other words, people can develop particular affection to their locale precisely because it is spatially or functionally close to (or harbors) a multiplicity of other cultures, and is wide open to them. As already suggested, localism is not necessarily correlated with closure, nor with the other features of Toennesian community.

Finally, it should be clear that the "levels of attachment" scale is a crude attempt to measure and test the Federalist doctrine. Roughly, two basic models of political organization can be confronted: the Jacobin-centralist-nationalist, and the federalist. In the first, there are only three subjects: the citizen, the State and Humanity, and the

State sits at the center of this political universe. In the federalist view, between the individual and mankind there is a very complex web of social forms, grown out of historical experience: family, local communities of various levels (from neighborhood to state to supra-national entities), associations and organizations of all kinds. Each of them is the product of spontaneous social interaction, and each has its function and worth. "We belong to all levels of Communities, and owe our loyalty to each of them" (Doxiadis, 1969). The system is subject to continuous change, mainly in the direction of enlargement, differentiation, integration and complexification. The Nation-State has been a very important phase in this development, but cannot claim any special *ethical* status. It grew out of special social conditions, and should go with them. Various societal tendencies push for the devolution of its powers both upwards, to supra-national agencies, and downwards, to regional and local entities. The Federalist doctrine envisions a complex, organic, hierarchical, nested system of political entities; geared on the one hand to the global unity and the integration of humankind, and on the other hand to the protection of the diversity, identity and rights of all individual and collective subjects. Regionalism is another name for federalism. The trend toward global unity should be balanced by the upgrading of local communities, for, as Mumford (1967) put it, "To assemble peace-making power into a world authority, without a revitalization of autonomous smaller units capable of exercising local and regional initiatives, would be to rivet together the ultimate megamachine". And interest in the infinite plurality and differentiation of individual regions is what makes people love to travel freely around the world. Local and regional diversity is what makes it worthwhile to strive for global unity.

The federalist model certainly lacks the clarity and power of the stato-centric one, and in fact runs into all sort of difficulties. But it seems the only one capable of bridging, in an acceptable way, the two eternal polarities: the individual and the world, the subject and the system, local identities and global identification; and capable of weaning man out of his primordial fixation with his "national tribe" and making him tolerant of the inescapable complexities of the world system.

Some notes on the six studies

All studies were based on "structured" questionnaires administered by trained interviewers in the respondent's premises. All have used standard statistical multivariate procedures for analysis. The first three were carried out within the framework of the Institute of International Sociology of Gorizia, at the instigation of its founder and first director, Prof. Franco Demarchi; the fourth is part of an inter-university research program on "territorial attachment", funded by the Italian Ministry of Education and directed by Prof. R. Gubert, one of Demarchi's disciples. Study no. 5 was the responsibility of Dr. J. Pohl of the Institute of Geography of the Technical University of Munich, an institute whose director, Prof. Robert Geipel, led a number of surveys in the Friuli region, following the 1976 earthquake. The study was done in cooperation with the Sociological Section at the University of Udine. This latter team also carried out study no. 6.

Study 1 was done in 1970 in the provinces of Trieste and Gorizia (total population about 380,000). The random sample was 1215. The general theme was "living at the border": perceptions, attitudes, opinions and behavior regarding the border, its functions and meanings; the neighboring state; ethnic

and national minorities; the boundary-maintaining institutions (the guards, armed forces, the State) etc. It was published in full as R. Gubert, *La situazione confinaria*, Lint, Trieste, 1972.

Study 2 focused on reciprocal perceptions and attitudes of 11 different groups, defined ethnically and spatially, living along the whole Italian-Yugoslav boundary (provinces of Udine, Trieste and Gorizia; population considered, ca. 430,000). The sample is not representative of the overall population, but only of the defined groups; in each, 100 individuals were selected, regardless of the group's widely different size. The questionnaires were administered in 1973; the results were published in A.M. Boileau, E. Sussi, *Dominanza e minoranza. Immagini e rapporti interetnici al confine Nord-orientale*, Grillo, Udine, 1981.

Study no. 3 is based on a doctoral thesis done by Mr. A. Spelich, who in 1980 administered a short questionnaire to a random sample of 400, representative of the population of the province of Gorizia (with the exclusion of the capital town). The main topics were the attitudes toward a proposed reorganization of administrative districts, the attraction of the three main centers of the area (Udine, Trieste, Gorizia), and ethnic-regional identification. The results were published in two articles by R. Strassoldo, *Legami territoriali nella provincia di Gorizia. Un sondaggio demoscopico*, in "Studi Goriziani", 62, 1985; and *Sociologia spaziale e appartenenze territoriali*, in "Sociologia urbana e rurale", 16, 1985.

The institutional framework of study no. 4 has been indicated above. The questionnaire, though rather large (over 200 variables), was strictly focused on the spatial dimensions of the "lifeworld", and the "feelings of territorial belonging", attachment, etc. The research involves 4 different regions in North-eastern Italy (Emilia Romagna, Veneto, Trentino, and Friuli). The field research was done in 1985. In Friuli, the research group based at the University of Udine includes B. Cattaruzzi, N. Tessarin, B. Tella, and the present writer. Four areas were selected for their sharp difference in "ecological" structure and morphology (a town of 100,000, Udine; two villages in rural plains; two coastal settlements; and a cluster of villages in a mountain valley). In each, 1,00 individuals were interviewed. The results of the first analyses have been published: R. Strassoldo, N. Tessarin, *Le radici del localismo. Indagine sociologica sull'appartenenza territoriale in Friuli*. Reverdito, Trento 1992. For a brief account in English, see N. Tessarin, *Socio-spatial patterns of territorial identity*, in "Proceedings of the 11 IAPS conference", Metu, Ankara, 1990.

Study 5 focused on the topic of "feelings and symbols of regional identity in Friuli". It is based on questionnaire interviews (n = 521) carried out in 1986 by a team of German scholars in five small communities in Friuli. It is still in the early stages of analysis. A preliminary publication is: J. Pohl, *La coscienza regionale dei friulani all'interno e all'esterno dell'area terremotata*, in G. Vainassi (cur.) *L'identità regionale*, Quaderni dell'Istituto di geografia, Università di Trieste, 1990.

Study 6, carried out in 1988, is a pre-electoral opinion poll commissioned by local politicians, on a sample of 1200, representative of the whole of Friuli (provinces of Pordenone, Udine and Gorizia, with a total of ca. 1,000,000 people). The questionnaire dealt with a wide variety of political issues (international, national and regional problems; opinions on parties, institutions, etc.; dynamics of electoral choice; socio-cultural attitudes, etc.). The research team included F. Buratto, G. Delli Zotti, B. Tella and the present writer. Only a small part of the data has as yet been published, and none in scientific journals.

Selected references

- Agnew, J. (1987) *Place and Politics*, Boston, Allen and Unwin.
 Alger, C. (1990) *Local response to global intrusions*, Paper presented at the session on Globalization, Technology, and Territorial Identities, Madrid: XII World Congress of Sociology.
 Buehl, W. (1978) *Transnationale Politik, Internationale Beziehung zwischen Hegemonie und Interdependenz*, Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta.
 De Rosnay, J. (1974) *Le macroscopie*, Paris, Seuil.
 De Rougemont, D. (1977) *L'avvenir est notre affaire*, Paris, Stock.

Doxiadis, C.A. (1968) *Eskistics, an introduction to the science of human settlements*, London, Hutchinson.

Collins, R. (1981) *On the microfoundations of macrosociology*, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 85, No. 5.

Featherstone, M. (ed.), (1988) *Post Modern Society, Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol. 5, No. 2-3.

Giddens, A. (1985) *The constitution of society*, Oxford, Univ. Press.

Gottmann, J. (ed.), (1980) *Centre and Periphery, Spatial Variations in Politics*, Beverly Hills-London, Sage Publications.

Konecny, F. (1962) *On the plurality of civilizations*, London, Polonica.

Lemert, C. (1979) *Sociology and the twilight of man*, Carbondale and London, Southern Illinois Univ. Press.

Luhmann, N. (1975) *Die Weltgesellschaft*, in Luhmann, N. *Soziologische Aufklärung*, Opladen, Westdeutscher.

Magnaghi, A. (1990) *Politiche ambientali e sviluppo locale*, in Trevisiol, E. (ed.) *Territorio e società nella transizione ambientale*, Bologna, Esculapio.

Mannheimer, R. (1991) *La lega lombarda*, Milano, Feltrinelli.

Milbrath, L.W. (1984) *Environmentalists. Vanguard for a new society*, Albany, State Univ. of New York Press.

Milner, Z. and Spitchal, S. (1988) *Globalization and Individuation in Social Development and Comparative Research*, Paper presented at the ISA conference, Cross-cultural and International Research, Ljubljana (mimeo), published Slovene version, *Primerjalno raziskovanje in razvojni procesi, Družboslovne razprave*, Ljubljana, No. 6.

Moore, W. (1966) *Global sociology: the world as a singular system*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 71.

Mumford, L. (1964) *The Pentagon of Power*, London, Secker and Warburg.

Piore, M. and Sabel, C.F. (1984) *The second industrial divide*, New York, Basic Books.

Poche, B. (1979) *Mouvements régionaux et fondements territoriaux de l'identité*, in *Cahiers Internationaux de sociologie*, No. 66.

Rosenau, J.N. (1990) *Turbulence in World Politics: a Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press.

Russett, B. (1967) *International regions and the international system*, Chicago, Rand McNally.

Sedlmayr, H. (1948) *Das Verlust der Mitte*, Wien.

Serrini, M. (1990) *Ancora: materiali critici sul localismo*, in Trevisiol, E. (ed.) *Territorio e società nella transizione ambientale*, Bologna, Esculapio.

Shils, E. (1975) *Center and periphery*, Chicago, Chicago Univ. Press.

Simonsen, K. (1990) *Planning in post-modern conditions*, in *Acta Sociologica*, No. 33.

Strassoldo, R. (1979) *Temi di sociologia delle relazioni internazionali*, Gorizia, ISIG.

Strassoldo, R. (1981) *Center and Periphery. Socio-ecological Perspectives*, in Kuklinski, A. (ed.) *Polarized Development and Regional Politics*, The Hague-Paris, Mouton.

Strassoldo, R. and Delli Zotti, G. (eds.), (1982) *Cooperation and Conflict in Border Areas*, Milano, Angeli.

Strassoldo, R. (1985) *Ethnicity and regionalism. The case of Friuli*, *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 6, No. 2.

Strassoldo, R. (1986) *Thinking Globally and Acting Locally. A Study of Environmental Opposition to Growth Projects in Friuli (Italy)*, paper presented at the session on Ecological Crisis, Growth and Development, XI World Congress of Sociology, New Delhi (mimeo).

Strassoldo, R. and Tessarin, N. (1992) *Le radici del localismo. Indagine sociologica sull'appartenenza territoriale in Friuli Trentino*. Reverdito.

Teune, H. (1990) *Multiple Group Loyalties and the Security of Political Communities*, Paper presented at the session on Globalization, Technology and Territorial Identities, Madrid, XII World Congress of Sociology (mimeo).

Thompson, W.R. (ed.), (1983) *Contending Approaches to World System Analysis*, Beverly Hills-London, New Delhi, Sage Publications.

Williams, C. (ed.), (1982) *National Separatism*, Vancouver and London, Univ. of British Columbia Press.