

Istituto di Sociologia Internazionale
Institute of International Sociology
Gorizia

SOMMARIO - CONTENTS

Nota del curatore

Editor's foreword

CONFINI E REGIONI

il potenziale di sviluppo e di pace delle periferie

Gorizia, 24-27 Marzo 1972

BOUNDARIES AND REGIONS

explorations in the growth
and peace potential of the peripheries

From the Geography to the System Approach

a. Study monographs

Case Studies

b. Scambi e rappresentazioni in situazioni europee

Case Studies: Exchanges in the European Region

c. Confini e sistemi

Boundaries and Systems

Atti del convegno

"Problemi e prospettive delle regioni di frontiera"

III. Confini e sovranità: l'approccio giuridico

Boundaries and Sovereignty: the Legal Approach

Proceeding of the Conference on

"Problems and Perspectives of Borders Regions"

IV. Confini, conflitti, integrazione e pace: l'approccio politico

Boundaries, Conflicts, Integration and Peace: the Political Approach

Gorizia, 24-27/3/1972

a. La ruolo dei confini e conflitti

The Role of Border Conflicts

b. Confini, frontiere e stati

Boundaries, Frontiers and States

V. Confini, popoli e culture: l'approccio sociologico

Boundaries, Peoples and Cultures: the Sociological Approach

a. Open Society: l'Europa e le regioni di frontiera. P. Prati-Venezia Giulia

Sociological Year: the Frontier Regions. Prati/Venezia Giulia

b. Confini e etnie

Boundaries and Ethnic Groups

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SOMMARIO CONTENTS

Nota del curatore	I
<i>Editor's foreword</i>	II
Il Convegno Internazionale "Problemi e Prospettive delle Regioni di Frontiera" Gorizia, 24-27 Marzo 1972	1
I. Introduzione allo studio dei confini <i>Introduction to the Study of Boundaries</i>	13
II. Confini, scambi, pianificazione e sviluppo: dall'approccio geografico all'approccio sistemico <i>Boundaries, Exchanges, Planning and Development: from the Geography to the Systems Approach</i>	
a. Studi monografici <i>Case Studies</i>	59
b. Scambi transfrontalieri in due regioni europee <i>Cross-Border Exchanges in two European Regions</i>	177
c. Confini e sistemi <i>Boundaries and Systems</i>	239
III. Confini e sovranità: l'approccio giuridico <i>Boundaries and Sovereignty: the Legal Approach</i>	291
IV. Confini, conflitti, integrazione e pace: l'approccio politico <i>Boundaries, Conflicts, Integration and Peace: the Political Approach</i>	
a. Lo studio dei conflitti confinari <i>The Study of Border Conflicts</i>	315
b. Guerre, frontiere e stati <i>Wars, Frontiers and States</i>	337
V. Confini, popoli e culture: l'approccio sociologico <i>Boundaries, Peoples and Cultures: the Sociological Approach</i>	
a. Aspetti sociologici di una regione di frontiera: il Friuli-Venezia Giulia <i>Sociological Traits of a Frontier Region: Friuli-Venezia Giulia</i>	385
b. Confini ed etnie <i>Boundaries and Ethnic Groups</i>	441
VI. Comunicazioni e discussioni <i>Communications and Discussion</i>	483

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND NATIONAL DEFENSE: A CONFLICT OF VALUES AND POWER IN A FRONTIER REGION

Raimondo Strassoldo

Introduction

This paper presents a research that has been published as the empirical, "on the field" part of a larger theoretical study on 1) international relations, war, peace research, the role of military institutions in the industrial society; 2) the concept of power; d) means and ends of regional planning, economic development and ecological balance (1).

The research stemmed from the problem of the "military servitudes" that has been one of the key political issues in the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region for some years, and was expanded to inquiry into the whole question of the heavy military presence in this region, its consequences on the economic, cultural, administrative, psychological, "ekistic", demographic and other aspects of the Regional structure.

Published and unpublished documents supply much of the empirical data; but the main tool employed was "élite interviewing", supported by several years of "participant observation" in the life of the regional community, with an eye on military-civilian relations. About a hundred key informants, protagonists of the "Military servitudes" debate, were extensively interviewed.

Fact-gathering was severely crippled by the reluctance of the Defense Ministry to collaborate. No data on the demographic and economic impact of military personnel in our Region were supplied, and permission to interview knowledgeable officers was flatly denied. So only a score or so of military informants were heard - unofficially if not secretly.

This paper is organized around five points. First, a brief analysis of the role of the military institutions in post-war Italy is given. Secondly, some aspects and consequences of the massive military presence in the Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia are touched upon. Thirdly, a short chronicle of the debate on the "military servitudes" is outlined. The fourth point is a tentative structural analysis of the situation: position of the several parties involved in the debate, their underlying motivations and values, etc. Finally the fifth part presents some provisional conclusions, some suggestion for further research and some possible "scenarios" that can guide practical action on the problem of the military presence in a frontier region.

The Setting: the Military in Post-war Italy

The Military in Industrial, post-war Europe

Powerless to defend itself directly, post-war Western Europe has lost interest in military matters at home. Hypnotized by the flare of Hiroshima, public opinion in this part of the world does not believe that another European war could be kept at the "conventional" phases of the escalation ladder; so the conventional armed forces are largely seen as useless and obsolete. Scorn and distrust are rather widespread feelings, specially among the more vocal and youthful minorities; traditionally anti-militaristic forces like the Socialists, the Christian-Democrats, the left-wing intellectuals ("liberals") are now in control of society.

The recurring attempts of the U.S. to involve more deeply the NATO partners in their own defense, making them pay for it, have met strong resistance. Governments have a hard time in making public opinion accept increases in the defense budgets. Sociological inquiries show that the social prestige of the military profession has sunk steeply.

This can be taken as a rehabilitation of one of the most ridiculed assertions of the founding fathers of (bourgeois) sociology, who predicted the withering away of militaristic values when the values of industrial society-work, production, wealth, well-being, rationality-would become dominant.

As the great military alliances put the bulk of military burdens (economic costs, strategic responsibilities, moral blame for the occasional necessity of dirty work, etc.) on the senior member, the smaller states can easily forget the social costs of defense and security, and can afford military inefficiency. In this protected environment the latent anti-militaristic elements of industrial society can flourish unrestrained by nationalistic ideologies and by the interests of cannon-makers.

The Military in Republican Italy

The loss of power and prestige of the military was particularly severe in the Italian case. In Germany, the Army had simply and terribly lost the war; the "Ohne-mich" attitude of post-war Germany resisting the idea of rearmament was characteristic of a people who served their duty to the bitter end and did not want to do it again. In Italy, the army was blamed for its ambiguous connections with the fascist regime, for its inability to avoid an unnecessary war, and for its inability to carry it out properly, if not victoriously. The participation in the anti-Nazi struggle of 1943-45 did not rehabilitate the Army in the eyes of anti-fascists, while its poor overall performance - in spite of many individual heroisms - deprived it even of the respectful awe gained by the Wehrmacht.

The widespread anti-militarism in post-war Italy is not reflected in the Italian Constitution, drafted between 1946 and 1947. Although refusing war as a means of resolution of international contrasts, it calls the military defense of the homecountry a "sacred duty of every citizen". The Communist party, then member of the governmental coalition, approved the definition.


The discrepancy between popular feelings and constitutional formulations could be explained in several ways. The leftist parties hoped to take over the entire country, and did not want to dismantle an essential instrument of power as the army. Moreover, it was better not to embitter further many thousands of professional officers, already frustrated by the defeat and popular scorn.

The parties of the Centre, who soon remained alone in Government as the cleavage between USA and URSS was reflected in Italy, maintained the army to build up defenses against the allegedly growing internal "red threat" to keep thousands of potentially dangerous officers off the labor market, already swelling with the unemployed, to honor the requirements of the new NATO alliance, and to gratify again the sense of national dignity.

The Conflict of Trieste

Patriotism, the feeling of national pride and honor, deeply embedded in Italian minds by a century of unitarian propaganda in the schools and in every cultural expression, had been strongly hurt by the military defeat, the struggle between Republican Fascists and the Liberation Front, the loss of all Colonies in the Egean and in Africa; in 1947 came the loss of Dalmatia and most of Histria, and the displacement of 250,000 Italians from those

“MILITARY SERVITUDES” IN FRIULI (1967)



territories; there was a real possibility that also Trieste and/or Gorizia could be assigned to Yugoslavia, and there were threats of bringing the Italian-Yugoslav border to the Tagliamento river.

Italian patriotism had found a point of coagulation. Despite some timid efforts by the Communists to support Yugoslavia's territorial claims, the Nation had found again a reason of self-righteous unity. The boundary between Italy and Yugoslavia was traced along a mutually acceptable line in the Gorizia area; but the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste and its two zones did not satisfy the two parties.

For five years the relations between Italy and Yugoslavia were very bad. Tito had become the private arch-enemy of the Italian nationalistic groups - the left-overs of Fascism, the conservatives, the middle classes, the students, the State bureaucracy. Trieste, the symbol of the great war effort of 1915-1918, had become again the pawn of Italian national dignity.

In 1953 the situation seemed to precipitate, and there was a distinct possibility of war with Yugoslavia. Students were rioting in the streets, there were some casualties in Trieste, and some divisions were sent to the frontier.

The Army in contemporary Italy


This was the last fit of nationalism and warlike attitudes of the Italian Government. It was a largely political and diplomatic move, as the units sent to the northeastern border had fuel and ammunition only for a few-hours' fire, and no reserves; it served to put the necessary pressure on the Allies and get the London Memorandum of 1954 by which Trieste came back to Italy. Although not all problems were solved, the Treaty gratified the Italian national ego; a good-neighbourhood treaty with Yugoslavia was signed in 1955, and the two countries busied themselves with other matters; and specially with economic development. The marvels of technology, industry and affluence distracted the public opinion from national values.

The Army thus fell completely off the picture. The Thaw and the doctrine of peaceful coexistence removed the impending threat of Russian expansion in Western Europe; the Dulles doctrine of immediate and massive retaliation placed strategic matters on a level quite out of the reach of intellectual comprehension and practical operation of the common European man. We learned to live with the Bomb; but our conventional armies seemed less and less relevant to security and defense. Nobody seemed interested in trivial problems of organization, efficiency, scopes, ideological climate, technology of the armed forces.

Politicians did not meddle in military issues. They were unpopular and brought few votes. The military were kept quiet by assigning them an annual increase in military expenditures linked to the growth of the GNP, and allowing most of this money (some 80%) to be spent in salaries and pensions. Nobody inquired seriously into the way the defense budget was spent, nobody expected the Army to demonstrate its adequacy to national defense. Some attention was given by the Leftist parties to the lingering of conservative, if not fascist, values in the military milieu; they complained more vehemently against the NATO affiliations; they asked for more "democratization" of the military socio-cultural subsystem and made token protest against the weight of the military budget; but they did not, as a rule, protest against appropriations to increase wages and standards of living in the Army. They too thought it better to keep the military reasonably satisfied albeit technically inefficient, and did not inquire seriously into strategical, technical and organizational questions.

The Right comforted the Military in face of charges from the Left; clinging to national values, it had in the Military a sympathetic audience; but it did not go beyond the exaltation

PERCENT OF TERRITORY SUBJECTED TO "MILITARY SERVITUDES" (ACT N. 1849)



of military virtues, past and present; this rethoric, gratifying as it was to the military ego, did not help them much in solving their many problems.

In sum it can be said that, save for a certain mild control over the political attitudes of the cadres (which involved some discrimination against persons with leftist or extreme rightist opinions) the Italian political class has very little control over the Army, in republican as in previous times; not because the Italian Military are particularly caste-minded, or particularly efficient in keeping out the curiosity of outsiders; but merely because the political system and the cultural system by which it is supported have so far lacked the interest, the will and the technical competence to dig into military issues.

The "contestazione"

For some 15 years the Army was thus left quietly to itself. The standard of military life, both for professional and for enlisted men, rose more or less in pace with the general economic progress of the country; during the Sixties, some attempt was made to give the Armed Forces a new "image"; Nationalism and the defense function were played down, and the role of the military institutions in educating the young men, in training them for civilian life, in contributing to the national economy, etc. was emphasized; and there was some attempt to give the Military a more professional, managerial, efficiency-oriented outlook. These efforts, by and large concomitant with the entering of the Socialist Party in the government coalition, puzzled and amused the Military but had little visible effect.

By the end of the decade however the Armed Forces were confronted with some real challenges. The Italian "economic miracle" had transformed the country in several important aspects, and some of these finally reverberated on the Military. Italy had rapidly become an industrial, urban, mass society; the increase in economic possibility made school attendance soar; the school system collapsed; the students revolted; the extreme-left "groupuscles" oriented the unrest against the several basic institutions of "bourgeois" society: after the school, the factory, the judiciary, also the Armed Forces came under the violent fire of the "contestazione".

The traditional scorn of industrial society for the Military, the diverse brands of pacifisms (socialist, christian, liberal), the cosmopolitanism of the mass culture, the hatred for capitalism, imperialism and NATO, the distaste for the discipline and hardships of military life, such are some of the factors underlying the present upsurge of antimilitaristic feelings among Italian youth. For the first time the characteristics, values and functions of the military organization are openly and radically criticized in leaflets, posters, journals and books that are eagerly read by the young people; some groupuscles start a precise policy of infiltration in the barracks, to incite unrest and revolt. Cases of conscientious objection multiply, and draw much public sympathy; small-scale mutinies occur with growing frequency. The traditional rule that politics must stop at the barrack's gates is ridiculed; with the growing number of ideologized students and intellectuals in uniform, the officers cannot easily rely on the higher morality of the "Patria" and on their superior socio-cultural status to maintain discipline, as they used to when the troops were illiterate peasants.

This "contestazione" is in full bloom, but the military organization does not seem overly alarmed. Little is known of the real organizational and "ideological" countermeasures the Army is taking; the impression is that the traditional antiintellectualism of the military, their scorn for words, ideas and printed matter, makes them underestimate the power of political propaganda. They trust the power of facts; they think that simple contact with the real military life is the best counterpropaganda; that young rebels become good citizens after

serving their time.

Whether this is true remains to be seen. But this does not concern us here. The wave of youthful revolt interests us only insofar as it has sparked off a number of intellectual, more or less sociological, studies on the Italian Armed Forces. Literature on the subject, almost non-existent before 1968, has been growing exponentially since then; and it is hoped that sooner or later something really serious, really informed, really scientific, might come out of it.

The Army and the Regional Decentralization of the Italian State

Another development of the sixties is the setting up of the Regions. The regional structure of the Italian Republic, provided for by the 1948 Constitution, had not been enacted for a number of reasons (in the first place, the fear of the Communist majority in some regions in Central Italy and the hostility of Roman bureaucracy to decentralization). Only the four regions with Special Autonomy created before 1948 (Sicily, Sardinia, Trentino-Alto Adige, Valle d'Aosta) existed. In the sixties, with the centre-left coalition, regional decentralization became a main political commitment and already in 1964 the fifth Special Autonomy Region, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, was established.

All these Special Autonomy Regions are border regions; but the latter one is also a strategically crucial region, at least as long as the Mediterranean remains a Western sea, and as long as there is a NATO confronting a Warsaw Treaty.

When the population of this area elected its Regional Parliament, and a Regional Government was set up, the Army was challenged from a quadrant quite as unexpected as the "contestazione"; although the challenge was quite different in form, scope and goals.

The Army in Friuli-Venezia Giulia

One Out of Twenty: Some Effects of Military Concentration in Friuli

For centuries, the "Gorizia threshold" has been one of the main routes of invaders from Eastern Europe to Italy (Goths, other Germans and Huns in Roman times, Hungarians in the Middle Ages, Turks in the Renaissance; and then the Hapsburg armies). This region saw the great Italian war performance during World War I. More recently, the contrast with Austria over the German-speaking Tyrol and with Yugoslavia over Trieste made the whole North-eastern corner of Italy (Veneto, Trentino-Alto Adige and Friuli-Venezia Giulia) militarily sensitive again.

Moreover, this is one of the outer land-boundaries of the NATO bloc. It is not as strategic as the German one, but it probably is more so than the Norwegian-Russian boundary or the ones Greece and Turkey have with Bulgaria and URSS, because it is on the route to the core of the Mediterranean. Thus, even though Austria is demilitarized and Yugoslavia non-aligned, this is regarded as a boundary not only of Italy, but of the NATO system; it is regarded by the military as the most important Italian frontier.

According to some estimates, some 50% of the Italian Army is stationed in the North-Eastern corner of Italy (the Regions of Trentino-South Tyrol, Veneto and Friuli-Venezia Giulia). Estimates of the number of military personnel in Friuli are very hard to obtain. According to political sources (leftist and autonomist parties) they should range on 120.000 which, in a region of 1.235.000 citizens, would bring the military percentage up to 10% of the total population. According to unofficial military sources, real number is half

as big: 60.000.

Some sources of the regional government have calculated a presence of only 40.000; but with questionable statistical procedures. Our own estimate, based on a variety of criteria, resulted in a figure of 70-80.000. Additional uncertainty stems from the difficulty of defining the "Military": especially in connection with the "Carabinieri" corps, the several types of police and other armed forces (like the Guardia di Finanza and the Guardia forestale).

There is however no doubt on the fact that in Friuli the military are much more numerous than in any other Italian region.

The effects of this heavy concentration are manifold; and one could theoretically classify them in 1) economic, 2) social, 3) cultural, 4) demographic, 5) political, 6) electoral, 7) ekistic, or in any other number of pigeonholes. The exercise would however be largely useless because the data available are very few.

What is impressionistically known is that many if not most villages and towns house military units of some size; that in most larger urban centers (from the provincial capitals of Gorizia, Udine and Pordenone, to towns like Casarsa, S. Vito, Codroipo, S. Daniele, Tarcento, Gemona, Palmanova, Cividale, Gradisca, Cervignano, to name only some) military expenditures in wages and taxes are an important element of the local economies. Cinemas, restaurants, bars and other leisure-time establishments thrive on uniformed patronizers. Housing demands and rents soar in the larger centers, where officers on duty in the barracks dispersed in the hinterland prefer to reside. Troops begin to be good customers also to a variety of shops.

Military personnel is particularly conspicuous on the roads and trains of these regions. Stations are usually full of troops. Military transports of all kinds are a common feature on the roads; lines of infantrymen marching along or columns of armored cars and tanks are not unusual either.

Many servicemen, coming from less developed parts of the country, use the military experience as a channel for emigration. The phenomenon is particularly interesting in the case of certain professional classes, like physicians. Most young officers and petty officers marry local girls; many try to settle here permanently; some leave the service and, using the acquired family connections, find some other job and integrate completely in the civilian milieu.

Soldiers come here from all the rest of Italy. They have some contact with the community around them; local citizens are accustomed to hearing all sorts of dialects spoken in the streets and in other places; the Southerner is not a stranger here as in other parts of Northern Italy; ethnic stereotypes are probably lighter in Friuli than in Piedmont or Lombardy or Emilia.

Long familiarity with the Military and their equipment makes extreme antimilitaristic attitudes, which are usually bred by unrealistic images, less frequent here than in other places. And then something of the military ethos can spill on the civilian population. Garrison communities, as many communities of the Friuli are, can be peculiar places.

Although not taking active part in local politics, the Military vote. Officers also vote in municipal elections, and towns with heavy military presence tend to have rather centre-right representation; all military personnel vote in national "political" elections, and the results in garrison towns favor the leftist parties (as the average Italian, even if in uniform, is more leftist than the average Friulian) (2).

Finally the Military make manoeuvres and war games, build barracks and fortifications

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The Debate over t

Early Frictions

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where they think best, and have an impact on the landscape. They coggle the roads, invade the fields, trample on meadows, litter the countryside, bomb and shell certain areas, start occasional bushfires, block the mountain valleys used as shooting ranges, disturb agricultural and recreational activities, and in many ways interfere with civilian life.

The consequences of the military presence on the landscape (the ekistic structure) are particularly evident where territorial defense is based on a system of fixed fortifications. Interred guns require clear ground in front of them, in which no building and no high-rise cultivations are allowed. This is no problem where the fortified boundary line runs through deserted highlands or other depopulated areas; but where the boundary cuts across urban and industrial areas, a contrast between civilian aspiration to growth and military requirements to security is bound to emerge.

The Debate over the "Military Servitudes": Genesis and Evolution

Early Frictions

For some time the Military were positively welcome in this region. They were not only tokens of defense and security against Eastern Red threats, but they helped business in a largely rural and stagnating economy. Mayors competed eagerly to have barracks located in their jurisdiction; girls were happy to marry out of farm labors. Of course, they brought some nuisance: manœuvres, spoiled vineyards, alien customs and blood, broken hearts. But peasant habits of submission to whatever uniformed authorities happened to be around (Venetians, French, Hapsburg, Italians, Nazis, Italians again in less than two centuries), heroic and horrific memories of the Great War, fear of Communist expansionism made it easy to accept them. Only the leftist minority grudged against the NATO which threatened to make once again this land a battlefield of opposing alien powers.

The Bunkers Hurt Property Rights

In the late fifties, after the London Memorandum had sanctioned the boundaries between Italy and Yugoslavia, it was decided in Rome, without the knowledge of the NATO, to fortify it with a thick grid of interred guns, popularly known as "Bunkers". The rationale behind this decision was, of course, that some defense is better than none, that nuclear war is as unlikely as conventional wars and *coups de main* are frequent, and that fixed artillery units are much less expensive (10 to 20 times less) than mobile units of comparable firepower. Of course, these things were not explained to local folks who, as everybody else, were conditioned to think in terms of nuclear warheads and intercontinental missiles, and who were therefore rather prone to ridicule the adequacy of those old tanks and their turrets disguised as haystacks and pasteboard rocks and wooden cabins. Familiarity breeds contempt.

Although many strings of *bunkers* were laid along barren river banks, or clustered at bridgeheads, many private properties were hit. Today, from 50 to 80 thousand landowners are in some degree affected by Military Servitudes. The damages suffered are of several types. *First*, there is the expropriation of the lot on which the installation is built; the expropriation procedures are brisk and authoritarian, but the payment of the indemnity is long and low. *Second*, often the expropriated lots spoil the arrangement of the whole estate. *Third*, the maintenance and inspection personnel are a nuisance, an intrusion. *Fourth*, and most important of all, every gun requires half a mile of clear ground for a certain angle; here

no tall crops and no buildings are allowed; and there is no indemnity whatever. 35.000 hectares, 4% of the regional surface (17% of the province of Gorizia) is subjected to such prohibition.

This severe encroachment on private property rights sparked the protest of landowners; the Milan and Rome headquarters of farmer organizations were called upon; a first bill, on the allowances to be paid by the State to the damaged proprietors, was presented by the Christian Democrat Senator Pelizzo in 1961; others followed.

The province of Gorizia, so gravely hit by the loss of its Eastern hinterland, protested vehemently against the servitudes, echoing the arguments of the landowners.

Industry and Tourism Feel the Pinch

But soon the farmers were joined by other forces. During the late fifties industrialization had reached this region. While many rural centers degenerated others emerged as "poles" or "islands" of industrialization. One of the most flourishing of them all, the "Chair Area" of Manzano, San Giovanni al Natisone, Corno di Rosazzo (with scores of small chair factories) is placed right in the middle of one of the most strategic and fortified zones, between the Torre, Natisone and Judrio rivers. Here the bunkers interfered not only with agriculture, but with industrial and urban development as well. Although in many cases the pressure of the developers' interests managed to bypass military limitations, resulting in a grotesque confusion of factories and bunkers, homes and Santa Barbaras, there was a strong feeling that the industrial development was thwarted by the defense requirements.

Another factor stimulating the public awareness of the "servitù militari" was motorized tourism. Rather suddenly, many depopulated areas in the mountains and along the beaches where the Military had their training grounds became tourist attractions; villages in the mountains, where military summer camps had been a source of revenue, began to see them as a hindrance to tourism. People looking for isolated areas in which to build a weekend home were sent away by sentries and vetos. Military columns plugged the streams of tourist cars going to the seaside or to the Alps. Building restaurants and other establishments in scenic spots often was not allowed by the military authority. Even taking pictures could get somebody into trouble: in large areas along the border, using cameras and binoculars or making sketches was forbidden.

The Politicians Seize the Issue

The public thus realized that the Military had some adverse side effect on local economy. The Communists seized this problem to attack the international affiliations of capitalist Italy. The emerging autonomist movements (Movimento Friuli) indicated the Servitù Militari as evidence of Roman oppression, of bureaucratic Italian centralism. The democratic government parties had to recognize the problem. The newly established Region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia acted as a chamber of resonance of the complaints of the affected economic categories and of political organizations interested. In its early sessions, the Regional Parliament declared the "Military Servitudes", covering with varying degrees of intensity a large part of the regional territory (estimates ranged on the 44% according to the definition of "servitude") to be one of the main responsables of economic stagnation of the region, of the depopulation of the mountain areas, of the large emigration, etc., and claimed for a full compensation. There were several proposals as to the modes of compensation: representatives of landed interests asked for adequate reimbursements; others pointed out that not only the single proprietors, but the community as a whole was damaged, and hence

entitled to indemnity; other claimed the right of the civilian authorities to be consulted by the Military on the more suitable location of their installations; the extreme left pretended that only a radical political - internal and international - change could solve the problem of the *Servitù Militari* and make Friuli flourish.

If there were dissents on the therapy, the political class was unanimous on the diagnosis. Even the neo-fascists joined the chorus claiming heavy recompensation from the national government to the regional community.

There were dissents also on the best way to make such claims heard at the Centre. The first pleas filed by the Region were repelled by the National Government, acting here (as in most military matters) as the mouthpiece of the Ministry of Defense: Regional Autonomy did not entitle the local bodies to interfere with national issues as territorial defense of the Motherland. So the regional political class decided to make the *Servitù Militari* a national issue; and local representatives to the Roman Parliament were given the mandate to present bills on reform and reimbursements.

Act n. 180 was approved in 1968, but had no consequences whatever; it could not be enforced for a number of technical and financial reasons.

In the meanwhile the debate on the Military *Servitudes* was raging on newspapers, in political and administrative assemblies; it had become a major electoral issue, and was loaded with claims and charges and emotions; all sorts of stories sprouted, on military insensitivity to civilian needs, on their bureaucratic dullness, on the inefficiency of their apparatus.

The Region Seeks the Truth: the Ad Hoc Committee for the Study of Military Servitudes

But this deluge of words and episodes had very little factual support. The Region wanted to assess with some precision the extent of damage suffered by the regional economy because of the MS, and the tools the legal system offered for their redress. A Study Committee of a lawyer, an economist and a planner was seated, but met with immediate difficulties. One was that the Military kept the strictest cloak of secrecy on the data they had in hand. Another was that their actual practice did not adhere strictly to the laws on the *servitudes*, which in theory attributed to them enormous discretionary power. A third point was that the issue was a very "nice" one, from a legal point of view. To recognize the right of proprietors to full indemnity of the limitations bestowed upon them because of military defense requirements could involve the recognition of the same right for every other limitation - including those for the protection of the landscape, the environment, the archeological sites, the order in urban development. In other words, the principle that every limitation of private property in the public interest must be fully compensated could not be invoked, under pain of inanity of all efforts to rational territorial planning.

The experts tried to bypass the difficulty in two ways: on one hand they likened the military *servitudes* not to limitations in the public interest but to actual expropriation; on the other they asserted that limitations to private property for conservation of the environment and rationalization of the settlements are essentially different from limitations arising from defense requirements: the first are in favor of the very community to which the proprietor belongs, the second in favor of the national community. But such reasonements were slippery and dangerous, and the workings of the Commissioners were not made public. Nor was their request for more research adopted. The Region failed to measure objectively the losses suffered by the regional economy because of the MS (*Military Servitudes*). Some very rough estimates set it at 4 billion lire; less prudent guesswork goes to 7.

Where Science Fails, Good Will Helps: the Joint Committee, Military and Civilian

Tricky and costly as a scientific research on the problem was, the Region preferred to tackle the problem empirically. An unofficial Commission was set up in Padua, headquarters of the Military responsables for the MS, in which the representatives of the three provinces involved (Udine, Pordenone, Gorizia) plus a representative of the Region would meet periodically with the Military and try to settle the particular problems as they emerged.

The Military agreed to such informal arrangement because they could hardly remain completely aloof of the mounting pressure of public opinion, expressing itself unanimously at several levels - Rome included; but could not admit officially civilian intrusion in military matters as fortifications and defense planning.

They recognized that the fortification project enacted in 1959-60 had been a little hasty and excessive; already in 1963 the first protests - specially from Gorizia - had brought about a sensible revision and a reduction of the areas affected. The pressure of public opinion persuaded them of closer informal contacts with local administrators in order to agree in advance upon the places to be subjected to servitudes with minor damage to the civilian activities; and finally a policy of broadmindedness was enacted in 1966, with respect to authorizations to plant and build in subjected areas. If a proprietor was willing to undersign a declaration that he would destroy and take everything away at the Military's nod, he could do practically everything. From 1966 to 1971, 1317 such demands were advanced; only 160, 12%, were rejected.

This liberalization did not solve all problems, of course. Non-demands do not appear on statistics; there is no easy way to know how many initiatives were not even taken because of the psychological repulsion for that declaration, or for the procedure, or for lack of credit (banks do not finance mortgages on buildings subjected to that clause). Moreover the Military have the habit of silence. They did not argue with the politicians exploiting the Military Servitudes issue.

The Protosynchrotron at Doberdò and the Alleged Military Blackmail

In 1967 an incredible perspective appeared on the horizon: the CERN, European organization for atomic research, designated the hamlet of Doberdò, near Monfalcone in the province of Gorizia, as one of the most likely candidates for the localization of a huge machine, the Protosynchrotron of 300 Gev, a circular apparatus with a diameter of 1,5 miles, an estimated cost of 500 million dollars, and a manpower absorption of 4,000 highly paid scientists and technicians.

The thing, if realized, would have transformed the face of the whole region, and all the authorities pressed for it. But then difficulties arose, of national and international character. The Military had been known to have presented their own objections to the installation of the machine-town right on the border; it would have disrupted the fortification system and implied a complete revision of defense criteria. There was a rumor that they had asked for a new armored division in place of the fixed fortifications; which the Government would not give them. As the credibility of the Protosynchrotron began to faint away, the left accused the Military - in the Roman Parliament, on several magazines, at the regional level - to be the main responsables of the loss of the magnificent opportunity for progress. For a couple of years, the *Servitù Militari* and the Protosynchrotron issues heightened each other.

Soldiers Go Home!

By now, public opinion was very sensitized to the problem. The Military were openly

attacked as servants of the Pentagon by the communists, as oppressive authoritarian Italian bureaucracy by the autonomists, as warmongers by the pacifists, as obsolete leftovers of feudal times by technocrats and entrepreneurs; the wave of antimilitarism connected with the general "contestazione" had reached Friuli too. It became fashionable to be against them as a matter of principle; even if in a much more moderate way than in other Italian milieux. It became increasingly difficult for the Military to implement their fortifications. Every new imposition of servitudes made big news; some town councils resigned in protest; some others debated whether to send the population on the streets to demonstrate against the Military and their servitudes. Suddenly, mayors ceased their rush for the localization of barracks on their territory; although economically still convenient, they had become socially and politically undesirable. The Military had also to retreat from many of their training grounds and firing ranges, and found increased difficulty even in purchasing suitable stretches of land.

The State of the Matter and Outlook

In the meantime, the failure of Act n. 180 on the Military Servitudes spurred the elaboration of other bills. Christian democrats, Communists, Socialists, Democratic Socialists, Leftist Socialists (PSIUP), Republicans, almost each party presented its own bill. Common to them all was the recognition of the right to full indemnity; some provided also some forms of civilian control on the actual need and adequacy of the servitudes, through previous consultations and agreements; others limited themselves to the financial side. All were swept away by the premature end of the fifth legislature, and there the matter rests. Pleas and protests against the MS continue to recur on newspapers and on resolutions of local bodies, communal, provincial and regional; but they sound increasingly ritualized. With the ebbing of the "contestazione", antimilitaristic attacks no longer impress as they used to. The depressive effects of the Servitudes are still emphasized, but with increasing awareness that this is in large part merely a platform to ask for special aids from the national government, to alleviate the marginal position of the Region. The regional upheaval against the Servitudes, in the middle sixties, has compelled the Military to allow for some minor adjustments to the civilian requests. There is little hope that the Region could formally posit itself as a counterpart to the Army and to the State. To get its indemnity, the Regional Community had to resort to the old mechanism - ask their representatives in the Rome Parliament to present a bill. The outcome of the whole fuss will probably be an annual grant of a few billion lire - from 4 to 7 - from the State to the Region in recognition of the nuisance of being a marginal, garrison region, full of soldiers.

The Problem of the Military Servitudes: an Analysis

A Theoretical Framework

It is not possible to keep historical description separated from social-scientific explanation; no description makes sense without an underlying causal theory on the succession of events, and no explanation is satisfactory if kept on a purely synchronic level. And, then, description and explanation are hardly to be distinguished.

The preceding account of the emergence and evolution of the problem of MS was obviously buttressed by some theory. In this section the theoretical assumptions will be brought to the fore, as a more detailed analysis of the problem will be attempted.

The problem can be approached from different theoretical perspectives. The first one is

the "Sociological Theory of the Borders" which the Institute of International Sociology here in Gorizia is attempting to develop through several researches and studies. Heavy military presence is a common feature in border regions (3), and indeed a dominant characteristic in *frontier* regions, if we define "frontier" as a *militarily important* border, after the Italian usage (4). We will not attempt to outline here the main lines of that theory, since several papers presented at this Conference by our associates deal with it.

The second theoretical perspective is the "ekistic" one, where by Ekistics we mean, after Doxiadis (5), the science of human settlements, in their geographical, architectural, economic and sociological aspects. Focusing on the physical dimension of human reality, the Servitù Military could be considered as a political-normative mechanism by which the Boundary exerts its well-known settlement-detering effects.

The third theoretical approach was the "community power structure" perspective, focusing on the political-sociological-psychological-cultural mechanisms by which the *values* of national defense, *embodied* in the military organization, are converted into *power*. In particular, the object of the "community power structure" approach is the discovery of the *points* (interfaces) in which the military and civilian decision makers confront their aims and wills, the *methods* by which the inevitable conflicts of power are solved, and the *outcome* of such conflicts.

Other approaches, of a more technical-economical nature (precise assessment of the economic consequences of the military presence in the regional economic system) although included in the preliminary research project drafts, were then discarded for lack of adequate data.

During the course of the research the focus shifted, in fact, from the ekistic-economical perspective to the political-sociological, as it became clear that the economic damages of the military presence were not factually demonstrated by anybody; and the fact that, nevertheless, the political class was deeply persuaded of its importance, was proof of underlying "wissensoziologisch" mechanisms at work. In other words, what became particularly interesting was not the amount of damages due to the MS, but the ways in which this "social problem" was born, developed, and put to work by politician for their own ends; (whether they be of regional, national or international scope, sectoral or global, and however different might be their emphasis on proposed solutions and means), and the way in which the problem involved the different components of regional public opinion, vocal or silent. In sum, the problem of the MS became a problem of the relationships between values and interest, of the transformation of interests into political demand, of diffusion of values from the political class to public opinion through the control of mass media, of the effect of electioneering in a democratic system on public debates of social problems, of conflict of values between the civilian and the military subsystems, etc.

A social and political problem is said to exist when people think so; when they so define the situation; when the social consciousness (public opinion) is aware of a discrepancy between the "real" and the desired.

What the "people", the "public opinion", the "social consciousness" are is a very old and basic question. We assume here a difference between the "mass" of the people and its social and political "leaders", who are arranged in a "power structure". This we take as the socio-political subject.

Thus, a social and political problem arises when there is a discrepancy (a gap) between

1. The objective situation
2. The subjective situation

The subjective situation changes when there is a change in

1. The structure of power
2. The structure of values

Of course, power and values are closely interdependent; they have been defined as the two faces of a coin. And also the distinction between objective and subjective is only analytical. In sum, then, it seems useful to distinguish three elements of the problem:

1. Changes in the objective situation (fortification-building and imposition of servitudes)
2. Changes in the structure of social values (modernization)
3. Changes in the structure of political power (birth of the Region).

What seems to have happened in the case of the MS is that a change in the objective situation created an objective (technical-economic) problem, at the same time when changes in the structure of values were taking place: the values of rurality, stability and nationality were giving way to the values of industrialism, development and regionalism (supra- and infra-national). Thus the technical problem became a social and political one.

Subsequent changes in the power structure - the creation of the Regional Government, with special autonomy - set a feed-back loop between value and power changes, in which the MS problem played a mayor role.

The Region preached the values of development, social and economic. Regional self-government and open boundaries were presented as prerequisites. The MS were taken as particularly strong evidence of the subordination of regional aspirations to national needs: they stood in the way both of development and of autonomy.

The MS were particularly well suited target for such charges, for several reasons:

- 1) the sense of security deriving from two decades of European peace and a decade of good relations with Yugoslavia;
- 2) the sense of inadequacy of territorial defense, fortifications, etc. in an era of nuclear warfare;
- 3) growing antimilitarism (due to factors such as spread of industrial-economic values, cultural evolution and imitation, etc.);
- 4) anti-NATO feelings.

Thus the importance of the MS problem in the social consciousness of the regional community (of its political class and the public opinion expressed at several levels) seems due to the convergence of three lines of tension:

- 1) tension to economic development
- 2) tension to regional autonomy
- 3) tension to open boundaries and pacifism

In other words, the MS were seen as obstacles to the realization of three very different but very important social values; they coagulated the hostility of different social groups of the region, that in the common hatred for the MS found a platform for unity. They were the most dramatic evidence of the conflicts between the national system and the regional subsystems. The very word "servitude" spoke of oppression.

Finally, the debate could rage and swell because there was no opponent. The Army never responded to the charges. No refutation ever appeared on newspapers. The debate took place only among the several political and professional groups variously interested in the problem.

The Military Servitudes became the perfect object of attack for the regional frustrations, the perfect argument for claiming justice from the State, in form of sizeable grants-in-aid. And the bigger the damages that could be imputed to the MS, the fatter the grants that could be requested.

Nobody at the regional level could be interested in assessing the real dimensions of the problem; and official memos from the Defense ministry or informal consultations with concerned officers could not be made public because of military "secrecy" or "reserve" (*riservatezza*).

The damages deriving directly from legal restriction to cultivation and building in front of fortifications and around some other installations as powder depots and radar stations (the Military Servitudes proper); the destructions suffered because of the great War, the depressing consequences of geographic marginality, the ancient closed-boundary policy of Venetian rulers, partly continued by the Italians, all sorts of ill-effects that could be imputed to past and present military conquest, activity and presence were lumped together under the *Servitù Militari* heading.

Not surprisingly, no word was made publicly of the economic benefices the regional community derived from the Military. Those who were damaged, cried loudly; those who profited kept silent.

Some observations

a) Public boldness and private prudence

The interviews with representatives of the several groups of the regional community on the military problem evidenced that beneath the MS debate, raging in the political arena, with dramatic overtones, lay a much more prudent and varied range of attitudes. The necessity of democratic political life led to the overplaying of popular (or allegedly popular) issues, well beyond the known facts; this was recognized by many politicians interviewed. "In electoral speeches, you must make the most of issues like the MS". Privately, many recognized that after all the MS problem was not as important as it was made to appear publicly; but added that this cannot be said, because otherwise the Regional community would weaken its claim to compensation.

b) Inadequate knowledge

A second fact emerging from the interviews was the widespread lack of information on the subject. Some research on the MS has been done only by the Region and by professionals contracted by it; by the Communist leaders; by Christian Democrat representatives; and by Farmers' associations. All other writings and speeches and opinions on the subject were based on *very* second hand information. Moreover, all the research done concerned the MS and other negative consequences of the military presence; none the role of the Military in the Regional economic and social structure.

c) Distortions of the legal perspectives

A third fact was the prevalence of the legal approach in that research. Virtually all studies began with quotations of the hair-raising dictates of the 1932 Act, n. 1849, which, if really enforced, would make life almost impossible in these areas. With some malice, under the MS is thrown also the 1931 Act, n. 886, providing for military authorization for a large number of "ekistic" activities (building, opening roads, cutting timber, etc.) in border areas; the Military point out that this authorization has never been denied, when asked, and thus the law is a mere device for being informed on what is going on in those "militarily important" areas.

In the same way also the prohibition to take pictures and sketches and use binoculars in a wide strip along the border is emphasized as a most heavy and amusing MS; but the Military

They are therefore more interested in studying the problem scientifically, in sticking to the facts.

Of particular interest is the attitude of urban planners toward the MS debate. They tend to see it as mere propaganda. One of the main contentions of MS opponents, that it thwarts urban development and rationalization of settlements, is scorned as gross exaggeration. Only in a few cases the military restrictions to civilian buildings have posed really embarrassing technical problems to the planner. In some other cases they have obliged to more expensive solutions. In many other cases they have simply set some constraint to the planner's freedom of choice; in most cases, they had simply no effect whatever. Many planners point out that there are many more cases in which the MS have been beneficial - limiting town administrator's megalomaniac dreams, protecting the landscape, checking land speculation -, than cases in which the Military have really damaged the urban and industrial expansion. In a situation of urbanistic anarchy, as the Italian one has been for a long time, every legal limitation to lawless building activity is useful; and MS proper are only such a limitation, along with laws for the protection of archeological sites, soil conservation, etc. Of course per se the Military do not care for environmental order and conservation; when they need it, they do not hesitate to ruin the landscape; but there is a significant common area of interests between military requirements and the concern of conservationists and urban planners.

Most planners, in town administrations or in the free profession, confess furtively their gratitude to the MS for having made their job easier; given the secrecy of the MS regulations, the planners would blame on them those restrictions they wanted to enforce. But this could not be said publicly. Of course, this has nothing to do with their personal feelings toward the Military; even if a certain appreciation is not uncommon, many planners share the usual scorn for the military profession and organization.

g) Mutual Ignorance

The armed forces and the civilian society are largely ignorant of each other. The blame partly lies, no doubt, on post-war political-cultural lack of interest in military matters; but probably the armed forces' hostility to outside influence is the main responsible. The armed forces are a closed system. Although hundreds of thousands of people come in and out of it, and although the officers usually do not live in compounds, but among civilians, the Army manages to keep its boundaries locked by several mechanisms, the most important of which is the "secret" or "reserve". This means that no information concerning the Army is allowed to leak out without screening by official organs. Every public statement of a Military must be previously approved by some office; only information that gives a favourable impression of the Organization is let out. Independent intellectual inquiry into the armed forces is unthinkable in Italy. All relations of the Army with civilian culture are public relations and propaganda, to the satisfaction of nobody.

Little wonder then that the civilian society has a very bad opinion of the army's efficiency, if all that is heard of it are celebrations of dubious past glories and of questionable benefices the Army says it brings to public morality and economy. Technical matters, strategic and tactical principles, organizational criteria, everything that even remotely concerns warfare, defense and security is classified. So civilians are prone to believe that such things do not really exist in the Italian Army. Civilian military culture is based on the very limited experience of people who served their time, on memories and on current talks about modern military matters and warfare. There is very little trust in the ability of the Army to defend the country; the Military are rather seen as a torpid bureaucracy, using

drill, manoeuvres and regimental celebration only as a pretext to make a living.

Such opinions, widespread in Italian culture, are not unknown in Friuli. Almost nobody believes, for instance, that the fortifications have any real use, save to keep some generals busy in designing them.

This distrust might well be based on complete ignorance in von Clausewitz's trade; the military might well be bitter about the lack of trust they are surrounded with; the fact is real, and the Army itself is responsible for it.

On the other side the Military are usually ignorant of civilian life. Although their *technical* expertise is often appreciated (e.g., military engineers) their culture is usually inadequate. As is well known to military sociology, the Military are usually practical and dogmatic, not intellectual and critical people. They tend to have few, clear-cut and outmoded ideas. Reading of politically committed magazines is rare, of sociological essays almost non-existent. Their knowledge of economy is impressionistic. When they talk about the civilian society they are usually no better informed than civilians talking of military matters.

h) Two Power Structures

As already hinted, the military concentration affects the "political" electoral results, giving to the Left (communists and socialists) a higher percentage than they would if only local citizens voted. In smaller towns with heavy military concentration, the officers' votes in the "administrative" elections support the center-right tickets. So there is some effect of the military presence in the power structure. But the idea that military authorities have some *informal* power, some obscure role in decision making processes going on in this region proved false. The Military as a professional group and as an organization support no party; they do not participate in active politics; they have only limited social contacts with civilian authorities. The most frequent ones are:

- 1) Ceremonies, both civil and military. The local military authorities are invited to some public celebrations (inaugurations of public works, cultural events, etc.). Local civil authorities are invited to regimental celebrations.

- 2) Organization of joint activities, specially for the Armed Forces Day (November 4).

Other occasions of contact stem from good-neighbourhood activities (harmonization of military and civil traffic, etc.) and from office duties (e.g., the Mayor is also member of the Draft Board) and from some social events (Regimental ball, etc.).

In general these are only formal and secondary relations; a tendency to their further reduction has been noticed during last years; but there are of course local exceptions, and the analysis should be more refined. The hypothesis can be advanced that the larger the town, the less important the Military in the power structure.

But besides some Celebrations Committee the Military do not take part *personally* in decision making processes. Of course, many administrative activities going on in this (but not only in this) region require the intervention of military authorities for inspection, control, approval, etc. But most of them are routine practices of little consequence, involving only bureaucratic offices. The 1931 and 1932 laws, so blamed for the economic depression of this region, involve for the great part only a lengthening of the bureaucratic *iter* of administrative acts, a great deal of paper work, letter sending and rubber stamping. Public works, road building, urban development and many other projects involving the modification of the *ekistic* status-quo must pass through the screening of the Army Corps of Engineers offices, in Udine or in Padua; just in the same way as they must pass through the "Sovrintendenza alle

Antichità e Belle Arti", the "Magistrato delle Acque", the "Genio Civile", the "Ispettorato Forestale", and now the Regional offices. To engineers and planners the military authorities are often the lesser headaches.

The administrative, bureaucratic role is indeed a power role; the Army has some discretionary power to deny permissions; but rarely uses it. It is dormant for several reasons; in part the Army too seems to think war unlikely, territorial defense somehow inane, and economic development more important; in part it probably fears the upsurges of antimilitarism. The Army does not feel legitimated to exercise the full power to which, indeed, the Fascist and authoritarian laws of 1931-32 entitle it.

Thus it can be said that the Army has, in fact, a very marginal position in the power structure of the regional community. Occasional charges that "In Friuli the Colonels have already come", with reference to the Greek *coup*, are not shared by most political forces, even if anti-militaristic. The two power structures, the military and the political, are quite separate, with only few points of contacts; tensions as these points in what originated the MS debate.

Attitudes toward the Military Problem: the Political Forces

The most important factors involved in determining public opinion on the problems raised by the military presence seem to be political affiliation, economic category and place of residence.

As to *political orientation* we can distinguish a) Centre (governmental coalition parties), b) Catholic left, c) Communist, d) Extreme left, e) Local autonomists (Movimento Friuli), f) Right (monarchists and neofascists). The *economic categories* more relevant seem to be the Clark ones, primary, secondary and tertiary. *Local communities* have different official attitudes according to whether they have military settlements or only provide grounds for training.

Of course, these factors do not appear to work in the same direction with regard to *all* problems subsumed under the name of MS.

a) *The Centre*. The attitude of adherents of the government coalition parties is to keep the MS problem at the economic-legal level, without letting the larger problems of national defense, pacifism, antimilitarism etc. cloud the issue. They tend to emphasize the economic damages, and to seek the attribution to the local civil authorities of a role in the decision making processes connected with the MS (localization of defense installation, assessing of damages, payment of reimbursements) mainly in order to reduce them. They are, however, not overly sympathetic to the Military as organization and as persons; the anti-militaristic attitudes seem widespread, even though not spelled out.

b) *The Catholic left* distinguishes itself precisely for its antimilitarism. The MS problem is treated mainly in this key. The Military are seen as remnants of feudal, fascist, nationalistic times and should be abolished in favor of open frontiers and universal brotherhood. Military defense is "provocative". The Military are scorned and ridiculed. Conscientious objection is promoted.

c) *The Communists*. Quite different is the position of the Communist Party. Specially in the recent years it has keyed down its criticism of the (Italian) Army; and it has never favored pacifism and conscientious objection in general (only that in Capitalist countries). It does not question the necessity of military defense of the National Sovereignty; it questions strongly the efficiency of the present Italian defensive criteria and, above all, the Italian international affiliations and obsession with Soviet threat, which are the causes of military

concentration in the Northeast and, consequently, of the MS problem in Friuli-Venezia Giulia; only a change in international orientation can remove it. Some criticisms of the ideological orientation and of the undemocratic organization of the Italian Army are however still frequent in Communist discourse. The MS problem is presented as evidence of the weakness of local autonomy and of the inadequacy of the local ruling class (*élite*). It favours civilian-political intervention in the procedures connected with MS as a means to control and democratize the Military.

d) *The Extreme Left*. While the left wing socialist party (PSIUP) (6) differs from the Communist position only for a slightly more pronounced criticism of imperialistic NATO and fascist Italian Military, the radical leftists resemble the Catholic left in their antimilitarism, and take the MS issue only as a pretext and argument for their antimilitaristic battle.

e) *The Friulian Autonomists*. The Movimento Friuli, which was one of the first to raise the issue, sees in the MS evidence of subordination of Friulian destiny to Italian interests. It does not attack the Military as such, nor the defense needs; it sees in the Army only an aspect of the web of bureaucratic organizations emanating from Rome and tying the marginal region to the national center, much to the harm of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, which is thought to have better chances of development if left free to self-govern. In this, the Army is no different from the school system, the tax-system, or the public administration in general. The problem of MS is not to be solved by international re-alignments or by utopian pacifism, but by administrative decentralization and increase of the capabilities of the regional community.

f) Finally, the *Right* merely acknowledges that the MS bring damages to some proprietors, who are entitled to full compensation; and to the regional economy as a whole, which is also to be compensated. But there can be no question of the necessity of defending the Fatherland's borders against the Communist threat from the East; nor is there question to make local politicians interfere with defense planning, that can be only competence of those who know best, the Military.

Attitudes toward the Military Problem: the Economic Categories

a) *Farmers and landowners*. In treating the farmers we should differentiate the "basis", the mass, from their organizational representatives, who are politicized, and thus tend to reflect their parties' attitudes to some extent. But many farmers share the destiny of being directly hit by the military presence in MS Proper and in other nuisances. Most hit are the landowning interests, because the prohibition to build hinders residential use in some areas, and thus depresses their property values. The extent of the damages, however, is difficult to assess. Farmers' organizations tend to put on the MS the blame for lack of initiative, demoralization, depopulation of many rural areas; the evidence however is scarce.

Another much-used item are the difficulties to fruit and wine growing in subjected areas; here too however it seems that areas suited for such cultivations are almost all used up, and the risk of over-production is looming on the horizon. Damages from manœuvres are usually paid for with satisfactory speed by the Military, although they do not compensate the psychological, moral aspect of the intrusion.

In sum, it can be said that while the mass of farmers and peasants has a certain detached respect for the men in uniform, and is not permeable to antimilitaristic talks, it resents of military restrictions to its activities; but would content itself with adequate reimbursement. Even occasional incidents with military authorities, which are widely exploited by the

political leaders, do not seem to shake the mass of farmers who do not read, nor usually participate actively in political life.

b) *Industrialists, small and otherwise.* Also the manufacturer's organizations are somewhat politicized. Near the older, more conservative organization, the Manufacturers' Association (Unione Industriali) more sympathetic to the Partito Liberale, recently an "Association of Small Manufacturers" has sprung up with a more center-left orientation. The two have different attitudes toward the MS problem. The former denies that the military presence has adverse effects on industry in Friuli-Venezia Giulia; nor, for that matter, relevant positive effects, as local plants have almost no contracts with the Defense Ministry. MS are not known to have deterred industrial localizations in the region.

The small manufacturer's organization (but the difference with the other Union does not lie in the first place with the firm's size) is rather more vocal on the MS problem, and blames it for some of the difficulties of the category. This organization represents small entrepreneurs just coming out of the artisan phase; they work within strict margins and have to make the most of every environmental opportunity; among which is the freedom to localize in the cheaper spots. This leads to dissemination of plants on the countryside and along the roads. Small industries are more individualistic and anarchic and shun industrial parks. They are against any urbanistic regulation trying to concentrate them; they are against military servitudes as they are against regulations to protect the landscape or the environment or the urban order. Small manufacturers often scorn nature-lovers and antique-cranks; so they scorn the Military and their "backwardness". They are not against the Army and defense, but against the traditionalism, leading to inefficiency.

In sum, the older Manufacturer's Union represents mainly old-style, consolidated, better-socialized and bureaucratized industrial bourgeoisie, more able to accept public regulation of industrial practices, localization included, and with a more sympathetic attitude toward the Military, both because of common values and because of family, social and other connections. The Small Industries Union represents a younger, lower class, less patient and less conservative breed of entrepreneurs, more permeable to antimilitarism.

c) *The Tertiary Sector.* Other businessmen usually profit from the military presence in the Region and worry lest the fuss over MS harm their business. Politicians usually point out that all economic categories are hit by the loss of wealth caused by the MS, because less money circulates. But suppliers of the barracks' kitchens, landlords housing officers' families, innkeepers and cinema owners, local administrators in places where the barrack is a main source of taxes, launderers, shopkeepers of several kinds and many other businessmen in the region thrive directly on military money and are not concerned with the damages suffered by farmers. The amount of money spent by the Military in this region for food, housing, recreation and taxes is not known. Rough calculations, based on a military presence of 60,000 troops and 15,000 officers and non-commissioned officers would give from 30 to 50 billion lire in salaries, 7 billion in other revenues of the troops (money from home), 40 billions for food locally purchased, 2 billions for consumption taxes, and a couple of billions in miscellany (civilian personnel employed, contracts for other than alimentary materials, direct purchases), for a total of 60-80 billion lire that the Army pumps into the regional economic circuit, and almost exclusively in the tertiary. In 1970 the Regional Gross Product had been estimated at about 1,000 billion lire; the Military would then contribute to it by 6-8%.

These figures are not official, of course, because the Military never make any public statement on such matters; and the military personnel do not appear in censuses and

statistics. Townships are not supposed to know how many people live in the barracks, and the money they spend out is not measured at the source. But it circulates, and propels the economy of many a town. Regional planners and politicians are not aware of this, but businessmen, who know their arithmetics, are. They do not believe that the damages of the MS even approach the economic advantages of the military presence. Even if they feel guilty about it, and say that "of course, industrial plants would be better than military establishments", and never speak up to the public, they do not believe that attacking the Military and making them go away would automatically bring industries in. So they favor good relations with the Military, even if they personally don't believe in territorial defense and do not like the military mind.

It should be remembered, however, that an important part of the tertiary sector - tourism - is subjected to conspicuous restrictions because of the MS, as already stated. The tourist boards not only have not grasped the touristic potentials of the military presence, but are also largely unaware of the present benefits. They are, instead, very concerned with the damages, and are a protagonist of the anti-MS drive.

Attitudes toward the Military: Urban-Rural Differentials

There is a distinct urban-rural difference in the effects of Military presence. Almost all major urban centers in the provinces of Pordenone, Udine and Gorizia house many families of military personnel. Even though nuclear tactics suggested the breaking up of military concentrations and the spreading of numerous barracks over the whole countryside, the officers continued to reside in the more lively and better served urban centers, commuting to the country. Such centers are also the place where the troops spend their time out, leaving every evening the villages they have been relegated to. Thus urban centers get more than their share of military revenue, as the average officer gets and spends more than the average local citizen.

At the other extreme stand places situated in the usual training grounds of the Army, who suffer all the nuisance and very little utility of the military presence (although allowances for damages to cultivation are, to some particularly poor village, a relevant revenue). They are sometimes rather bitter about it, and some phenomenon of unrest and impatience against the Military has been heard of.

For many small rural communities, the barrack has been for some time the main source of income to the municipal administration, but antimilitarism nowadays deters mayors, except the bolder ones, from calling for military settlements. The population's feelings, however, were usually ambiguous: while local businessmen favored it, catholic organizations and peasants objected to it on grounds of disruption of local morality, peace and habits. The traditional rural Friulian community resented the injections of soldiers. Here however one must distinguish between the corps: f.i. Alpine infantry units, made up of local people, have always been well accepted everywhere. Somewhat stronger objections to military settlements are advanced by predominantly Communist communities, in the southern part of the Region, where political reasons sometimes outweigh economic calculations. But the difference in *popular* attitude towards the Military reflects only dimly the ideological stand of the party; there seems to be no grass-roots active antimilitarism in Friuli-Venezia Giulia.

Military-civil Relations in a Border Region: Scenarios and Suggestions

Some Lines for Further Research

Some consequences of the military concentration in the border region of Friuli-Venezia

Giulia have been sketched in previous pages; but, it was warned, they were little more than personal or current impressions. No serious research has been conducted, to our knowledge, on the overall economic, social, cultural, ekistic aspects of the problem.

An intriguing aspect that should be investigated is, we think, the consequences of age-long military, more or less alien, presence on the personality and cultural structure of the border populations. The Friulians have been praised, or charged, for their patience, prudence, respect for social hierarchies, habit of submission, restraint, closure, "authoritarian personality" syndrome (7), passivity, discipline, military prowess, among other things. Is this true? and if it is, has long familiarity with soldiers and armies something to do with it?

The Friulian have also been accused of lack of entrepreneurial spirit. They are good workers but poor bosses. Friulian capitalists are generally known to prefer routine administration of what they have to the risks of endless reinvestment. Is this syndrome true? can it be traced back to military presence, to influences of the military bureaucratic spirit? In small towns, where the Military make up a good slice of the market of merchants and shopkeepers, does the stability of this income discourage innovating initiative? Is there a "garrison town", a "garrison region" spirit?

In other words, beside the more obvious problems of the real economic impact and ekistic consequences of military presence, some subtler but deeper - and perhaps more important - lines could be followed.

The Uses of Scenarios

On the basis the available materials it is, however, already possible to project some developments, to build some future "scenarios" that can help us to clarify our minds, to make today our value judgements and take our choices.

The military concentration in this region provides an unique opportunity to test "in vitro" some hypothesis and ideas that have been advanced in current socio-political literature on civilian-military relations.

This Region could experiment a much-needed reform of the role of the Army in modern industrial, western society. From here, examples could be set.

Of course, not everything that is true for a part can be applied to the whole. A region can deal with the National Army in ways the Nation cannot; f.i., a mass upsurge against military presence could alter defense plans and lead to concentration of forces more in the interior; without altering security requirements and international balance of powers. A whole nation could not as easily get rid of its armed forces. Contrarywise, a border could decide to exploit to the full the economic opportunity offered by military presence, and become a real "garrison community", fattening on the military money the rest of the Nation pumps into it. The Nation as a whole cannot hope to live on the defense budget.

But there are intermediate patterns of arrangements of Military-civilian relations which can be more generally relevant.

In the following pages, some of these possibilities will be explored.

The main variables of the models are:

1. Values and structure of the Army
2. Values and structure of the regional community
3. Type of defense
4. Structure of local military-civilian relations

One could go to any length in model and idealtypus building. We will limit ourselves to some subjectively more interesting combinations.

The Conscientious Objector Model

A first model, already alluded to, is based on the assumption that a massive outbreak of pacifism and antimilitarism would make life impossible for the Army in this region. Whether guided by political or religious ideologies of neutralism and unilateral disarmament, or economic interest to full exploitation of the regional resources, that would snatch every stretch of land away from military use, such feeling could persuade the Defense ministry to withdraw the armed forces more into the interior. The Friuli-Venezia Giulia would not cease to be Italian, but would be treated as a collective Conscientious Objector, refusing to serve once again as battlefield and stronghold.

Although economically costly to the Nation, the operation is not technically impossible. After all, it has been already authoritatively said that the strategic position of Friuli-Venezia Giulia is untenable; and W.W.I. in Italy was won on the Piave, not on the Isonzo.

The demilitarization would entail a loss of ten percent of regional income. But the community could be prepared to accept poverty for the sake of peace and love; or could substitute the losses of barracks and soldiers with industrial plants and workers, or hotels and tourists.

The garrison mentality of businessmen and innkeepers could give way to cosmopolitan attitudes and idealistic philosophies; or to energetic entrepreneurship and economic development.

The Garrison Region Model

A group of alternative models prospects an exasperated increase of the military weight of the Region, due to such reasons as worsening of international relations in general, or with Yugoslavia in particular, or break up of Yugoslavia and its conquest by the Soviet Union, so that this border would become a hot spot of direct confrontation between the opposing blocs. There would be also increased foreign (American, NATO) military presence; the installation of secret weapons would greatly extend the cloak of vetos, prohibitions, hindrance to civil activities; military servitudes would paralyse economic life; a relevant part of the territory would be used for manœuvres and war games; boundaries would be closed, tourism discouraged.

Here the pattern of military-civilian relations would be shaped very differently according to the defense criteria (conventional, professional or semiprofessional Army, highly technicized; or reliance on unconventional, guerrilla, and psychological warfare) and to civilian ideology (belief in the values for which the Army stands, indifference or opposition to them).

In the first case, the Military would dominate the community. Defense requirements would overrule any claim to regional self-government and autonomous development. The need to keep the local populations quiet would persuade the Army to pass them adequate alimony. The region would become a garrison community supplying services of all sorts to the military settlements; a community of traders, landlords, launderers, innkeepers, whoremongers, parasites living of what the military hands them, not caring at all about the values and goals of defense.

The "Militärgrenze" Model

In the second case, Friuli-Venezia Giulia would become a *Militärgrenze*. The local population would be invested in first person with the defense of the whole nation. The community would be militarized, responsabilized, indoctrinated. The traditional military

valor of these populations would be emphasized by training in the most modern guerrilla practices. The regional territory would be transformed to create an optimal environment for this kind of war (reforestation, etc.) while settlements of all kinds are discouraged. Feelings of international solidarity, of cosmopolitanism, of love and peace would disappear; values of economic development and welfare scorned and substituted by an heroic ethic of *Blut und Boden*. The Army and the Population would blend and integrate perfectly.

Progressive Models

Between these extremes stand a group of intermediate models, characterized by improving relations on the international level (at least in Europe and between the industrialized blocs) and continuing aspirations to self-respect and development at the regional level. Here the main variables are the military policy of the Nation and the ideological attitudes of the Region.

In this situation the politics of dissuasion gradually give way to integration and disarmament; national armed forces are transformed into international "constabulary forces" (8); national closed systems increasingly open up to exchanges and transactions of all sorts; territorial defense of borders is substituted by building up the defenses of peace in men's minds.

The army's military scopes become less relevant. The "nation-in-arms" (9) model will probably break down; the purely military needs, of monopoly of armed violence, will probably be taken up by a small, selected, professional élite. Other social functions of the conscription army - socialization of citizens to national ideals, mobilization of large amounts of human energy, availability of a large scale bureaucratic organization to perform special tasks in emergency situations, providing an outlet to young people's need for self-sacrifice, etc. - will probably be taken over by other institutions.

But the process will probably be long. The military structures are liable to survive their functions, because of usual social inertia. There will be a tension between socio-political values, anticipating a peaceful future without armies, and the perduring reality of the army.

The national political class has basically two alternatives with regard to medium range planning for defense: one is the *professionalization* of the Army, and "*civilization*" of all functions not directly related to the use of weapons or the risk of death. The other is the "*privatization*" of defense and armed forces, making each citizen and each societal level responsible for its own and collective defense; this would mean the opening of the boundaries between armed forces and society, and *militarization* (psychological and technical) of society.

The first alternative corresponds to a technocratic logic, leading to further social differentiation and division of labor, and to technical efficiency; the second to the democratic logic, leading to the recovering of former social homogeneity. The first risks alienation and military tyranny, the second risks waste and anarchy.

In both cases the civilian-military relations in the border region would be significantly affected; but not univocally.

The trend toward professionalism would, in the first place, reduce the number of men in uniform, of barracks, of space requirements. The region would lose that constant flow of young men from other parts of Italy passing here a large part of their service months. It is not easy to strike a balance of gains and losses in this respect.

The trend toward the democratization of defense would weaken the importance of territorial defense of the borders. When the whole people is potentially in arms, the whole

territory is potentially a battlefield. Friuli-Venezia Giulia would lose its strategic position; with all the benefits and losses attached to it.

Some Practical Suggestions

Exploiting, but not Overadapting to, the Situation

The Italian political class has not been able, so far, to decide on the most desirable trend. And in any case, the transition from the present situation characterized by confusion and lack of any military policy, to a new model, will take a long time.

So the regional community will be left for still several years with a massive concentration of soldiers on its territory; will be left to deal with a large, bureaucratic, closed military establishment interfering, to some extent, with the immediate future. How can it best exploit the situation without overadapting to it?

a) The first thing is, of course, to make the armed forces pay for all the adverse economic effects they cause; both the directly observable ones and those acting through "psychological" and cultural circuits (discouragement of economic initiative, etc.).

b) A second course of action concerns the exploitation of all possible benefits connected with military presence. Of particular relevance seem the touristic potentials. The military service brings here hundreds of thousand of young Italians that are liable to come back in later years if they are properly acquainted with the Region's recreational resources. Relatives of soldiers already make up for a large part of hotel customers in some communities. Memories of the great war could be a grisly and imposing archeological attraction for future generations, if they were presented in a less rhetorical and more realistic fashion. Also a warless future world will need the sobering reminding of the horrors and follies through which mankind passed (if it does pass). And finally, the Army itself could become a tourist attraction. The Army is, hopefully, an organizational species on its way to extinction; the Region could serve, for some time, as a sanctuary or a zoo, to which people eager to watch its doings might come. Weapons, tanks, drill, parades, war games are indeed an interesting show for many people. Hundreds of thousand of people watch every year the stunt flights of the air force; if properly organized, there could be comparable affluence of tourist to summer manoeuvres.

All this requires the establishment of good relations between civil and military authorities, between soldiers and population; it means that the Army softens its reserve and the regional community is not tempted by blind and self-defeating anti-militarism. The Region does not, in fact, have the power to chase the Military away: and if it can't beat them, it had better join them. This does *not* mean embracing the present military ethos, but realistically understanding their problems. The Military do not know and are little interested in the local community; then involve them more deeply. The Military are frustrated and embittered: show them your appreciation for their social function. Make them open up. Multiply social contacts, start common activities, talk to them.

Opening up the Army's Organizational Boundaries

Of course, as already remarked, much of the blame for military isolation lies with the closeness of the Army's organizational boundaries; and this situation can only be changed from the center, from Rome. The local communities can make friends with the commanders of local units; but as long as career development requires a rapid rotation of commands, and

the normal period of stay in one place is one year, there is no time and no motivation for setting good relations.

And if every initiative at the local level, with respect to relations with the community, has to be formally authorized by the higher echelons, another powerful hindrance is set. A third and crucial reform concerns the obsession for secrecy and reserve. This is a wall much more powerful than the one between the barracks and the community; both do great harm, and could be dismantled if the Army were willing to risk some trouble in favor of more penetrating relations with the community. Civilians are admitted to look into military matters only under rare and completely controlled (by the Army) circumstances; they are never allowed to see military things as they really are. No wonder they are not interested in the shows, and suspect shady things behind the scenes.

Pressing for Reform of Defense and Setting Examples

Reform of the Italian military organization in the direction of openness and of better integration of military institutions with civilian life is an issue of national importance; after the reform of housing, of health care, of the Judiciary, of public administration, of the School system, also the reform of the Armed Forces has been stimulating some political and cultural interest lately. Some study has appeared, even if rudimentary because of scarcity of data and expertise.

Such reform would be of particular interest to a Region in which a citizen out of ten is in uniform.

Military professionals usually love Friuli-Venezia Giulia and appreciate its population. Despite the MS debate, Friulani are largely impervious to gross antimilitarism embittering military-civilian relations in other parts of Italy. Military-civilian relations are here more intimate than anywhere else. It would not be surprising if from here some example and practical experience of good relations between the military institutions and the civilian community might emerge. Not the "human" and "public" relations, manipulated by the Army; but the kind of rapports that allow, among other things, a civilian control over the Military, mutual trust and support. Weapons have to be used by technicians, but there is no doubt that the best defenses are built into the minds of men, and this is possible only if the people trust and appreciate their soldiers. In the end, the softening of boundaries between Armed Forces and civilians is of mutual advantage. And it would make the Military more sensitive to civilian needs and values.

A regional community whose everyday life is so heavily dependent on the military presence, and whose destiny lies with the development of international integration and peace is placed in a unique position. Its task is to mediate between the national values for which the Army stands and the values of internationalism. It can teach a lot to the Army. It could help it adjourn its ideology and its organization. It could become a testing ground of new military-civilian arrangements. A wave of reform could start from here and eventually reach the rotten core.

Some initiatives are already around. Studies could be made, and discussions initiated. The Italian Army has been left to itself much too long. The Regional community of Friuli-Venezia Giulia, that has a concrete interest in its modernization and democratization, could contribute to break the spiral of military frustration.

A Remark on the Possible Contribution of a Border Region to Peace through good Military-civilian Relations

There are many approaches to peace research. Anatol Rapoport has recently proposed to treat the military establishments, all over the world, as institutional gangsters with a stake in world tensions and wars (10).

We tend to believe that peace is, in the end, a matter of education; and one cannot educate the Military by attacking them savagely. National Armed Forces should, in perspective, be eliminated; but as long as they are among us, we think that the best policy is to make them as less dangerous as possible. Education of the Military to the values of peace, of internationalism, of open boundaries seem an important enough contribution to peace. And perhaps it can be done, in this border region.

NOTES

1. Raimondo Strassoldo, *Sviluppo Regionale e difesa nazionale*, Lint, Trieste, 1972.
2. The proposition has been tested in Triest in a voting-behavior analysis by Giordano Sivini (forthcoming).
3. See the Demarchi and Ben Dak entries in this volume.
4. See R. Strassoldo, *From Barrier to Junction, towards a sociological theory of borders*; Gorizia, Oct. 1970 (Mimeo); F. Demarchi, *Introduction to R. Gubert, La situazione confinaria*, Lint, Trieste, 1972.
5. C.A. Doxiadis, *Ekistics, an introduction to the science of human settlements*, Hutchinson, London, 1968.
6. This party has disappeared following the elections in May 1972.
7. See Alberto Raffaelli's entry in this volume.
8. The expression is of Morris Janowitz, in M. Janowitz and R.W. Little, *Sociology and the Military Establishment*, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1965.
9. David C. Rapoport, in Jacques Van Doorn (ed.) *Armed Forces and Society*, Mouton, the Hague, 1968.
10. Anatol Rapoport, *Is Peace Research Applicable?* in "Journal of Conflict Resolution", vol. XIV, n. 2, June 1970.

Riassunto

Il Friuli-Venezia Giulia è considerata tra le regioni più importanti d'Italia dal punto di vista militare. Tale concezione, che sembra derivare da un millenario passato di invasioni dall'Oriente, dai Goti ai Turchi agli Asburgo, ed è stata recentemente rinnovata dal "complesso di Caporetto" del 1917 e dalle tensioni con la Jugoslavia a proposito di Trieste, culminate nel 1953, ha portato a una forte concentrazione di truppe ed installazioni militari in questa area; la presenza di circa 70.000 militari in una regione di 1.235.000 persone ha notevoli conseguenze su tutti i piani della vita associata: dall'economia alla politica, dalla psicologia al paesaggio. Lo studio prende le mosse dal problema delle "Servitù Militari", che per alcuni anni ha agitato la vita politica della regione. L'analisi indica che sotto questo termine suggestivo si concentravano tutti gli elementi di contrasto tra le esigenze della difesa nazionale (confini chiusi,

Résumé

Le Frioul-Vénétie Julienne est considérée, du point de vue militaire, l'une des régions les plus importantes d'Italie. Cette conception, qui paraît être due à un passé millénaire d'invasions de l'Orient, des Goths aux Turcs et aux Habsbourg, et qui a été renouvelée récemment par le "complexe de Kobarid" de 1917 et par les tensions avec la Yougoslavie à l'égard de Trieste couronnées en 1953, a emmené une concentration remarquable de troupes et d'installations militaires dans cette zone. La présence de quelque 70.000 militaires dans une région de 1.235.000 habitants a des conséquences remarquables à l'égard de tous les niveaux de la vie associée: de l'économie à la politique, de la psychologie aux paysages.

L'enquête part du problème des "Servitudes Militaires", qui a troublé la vie politique de la région pendant quelques ans. L'analyse indique que ce terme suggestif concentrait tous les éléments de

severo controllo del movimento delle persone lungo le fasce confinarie, segretezza delle installazioni e di tutto quanto riguarda la presenza militare, *statu quo* territoriale, disponibilità di infrastrutture e territorio per usi militari) e le esigenze dello sviluppo regionale (apertura dei confini, libertà di movimento, specie turistico, approfondita conoscenza di tutti gli elementi della realtà regionale ai fini di accurata pianificazione, modificazioni urbanistico-economiche, usi urbano-industriali del territorio). L'analisi prende in considerazione tanto i termini "oggettivi" e tecnici del problema, quanto i movimenti d'opinione e gli atteggiamenti politici che esso ha suscitato; e conclude con una serie di "modelli" e "scenari" sul possibile futuro sviluppo dei rapporti tra militari e civili in una regione di confine.

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contraddiction entre les exigences de la défense nationale (frontières fermées, contrôle sévère du mouvement des gens le long des lisières de frontière, secret à l'égard des installations et de tout ce qui concerne la présence militaire, *statu quo* territorial, disponibilité d'infrastructures et de territoire pour les emplois militaires) et les exigences du développement régional (ouverture des frontières, liberté aux mouvements, surtout touristiques, connaissance approfondie de tous les éléments de la réalité régionale au but d'une planification soigneuse, modifications géographiques et économiques, emplois urbains et industriels du territoire). L'analyse tient compte aussi bien des termes "objectifs" et techniques du problèmes que des mouvements d'opinion et des attitudes politiques qu'il a soulevé; on conclut par une série de "modèles" et de "scénarios" à l'égard du possible développement futur des relations entre militaires et civils dans une région frontalière.