

Regionalismus in Europa

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Band 1:

Der Regionalismus als Phänomen der europäischen Gegenwart

Die Konfliktherde und ihre Bedeutung

Internationale Probleme und Formen des Regionalismus

Triebkräfte regionalistischer Entwicklungen in Gegenwart und Zukunft

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Griechen noch Russen, Bulgaren und Serben mit eigenen Klöstern, Rumänen und Georgier mit Prioraten vertreten sind, leben die aromunischen Mönche im malerischen Einsiedlerdorf von Kavsokalyvia am Steilabfall des Athos ins Ägäische Meer. Sie pflegen vor allem Kunsthandwerk und erbauliches Schrifttum, während viel höher, in den Höhlen und Klausen von Hagios Vassilicos aromunische Autoren von Rang zu Hause sind. Der Großteil von ihnen sind Prälaten, die sich entweder während des Zweiten Weltkrieges zusammen mit der italienischen Besatzungsmacht für die Erneuerung des alten aromunischen Schulwesens eingesetzt oder im anschließenden Bürgerkrieg mit den slawophilen Kräften sympathisiert hatten. Sie leben nun schon bald dreißig Jahre in der Mönchsrepublik als eine Art Verbannte, erfreuen sich aber nur hier der Rede- und

Publikationsfreiheit, die ihnen sonst in Griechenland sofort genommen wäre.

An der Theologischen Fakultät von Thessaloniki spielen aromunische Professoren, die meisten von ihnen Verwandte des verewigten Patriarchen Athenagoras, die führende Rolle. Auf ihr Betreiben wurde vor einigen Jahren ein Institut für balkanische Kirchengeschichte errichtet, das unter seinem aromunischen Vorstand Prof. Stergios Saccu praktisch balkan-romanische Geschichtsforschung betreibt. Derselbe junge Gelehrte ist führendes Mitglied einer Bruderschaft von Laintheologen, welche die Verkündigung in aromunischer Sprache und die Erhaltung des reichen religiösen Volkstums der Balkan-Romanen allen Schwierigkeiten zum Trotz hochhält. Und darin liegen fast alle Hoffnungen der Aromunen für eine wieder freiere und bessere Zukunft.

R. Strassoldo:

Friuli-Venezia Giulia, a Border Region

Foreword

The aim of this paper is to provide a reasonably compact, updated and complete sociological overview of a little-known region. Although the "conflict of Trieste" was no mean part of the Cold War in the early fifties, and although the Friulian earthquake of 1976 was one of the worst natural disasters of recent Western European history, this area seems to be largely neglected and ignored in social-scientific circles as well as in general political and cultural discussion.

In particular there seems to be a certain confusion as to the meaning of Venezia Giulia, its relations with Friuli and with Trieste; a confusion that results also in a bewildering array of misspellings. This paper aims to state as clearly as possible that there is a) an ancient region called Friuli, b) an essentially modern city called Trieste some 30 km away, and c) a more vague geographical entity which Italian nationalists called Venezia Giulia and managed to appropriate for less than a generation, 1919–1943. The marriage between Friuli and Venezia Giulia was forced by the Italian Government in 1947–48 as a means to uphold the claims over the lost territories. But in practice today Venezia Giulia simply means Trieste, which in 1964 was named capital (a case of "external capital") of the whole region. The problems arise from the fact that Friuli and Trieste have very little in common, as a consequence of several centuries of quite separate political, economic and cultural history; and today they have very different structure, problems, interests and orientations. The differences periodically erupt in bitter disputes and threaten the cohabitation. The better part of time and energy of the political class in Friuli and Trieste is spent in mediating the opposing

interests, cooling the rages, and making it clear that Rome will not allow a divorce. This is openly advocated by local parties: the *Lista per Trieste*, that in 1978 has revolutionized the political townscape, drawing some 25% of electors away from all "Roman" parties; and the *Movimento Friuli*, that in this region regularly polls about 5% of the votes, a more modest but obstinate and vocal threat to traditional parties. The only things that the *Lista per Trieste* and the *Movimento Friuli* have in common is the desire to let their respective entities go their separate ways, and the opposition to Rome that will not let them go. This is the basic "contradiction" that must be set clear in order to understand Friuli-Venezia Giulia. Accordingly, this paper sketches in section A three separate historical profiles, one for Friuli, one for Trieste, and one for the Friuli-Venezia Giulia. But there is a second basic characteristic of this area, which likewise has an element of contradiction and of ambiguity: the frontier. This is tackled in section B. Both Friuli and Trieste are moulded by the "border situation" albeit in very different ways. To understand this aspect of the region it will be necessary to recall some concepts and theorems of the sociology of frontiers (or borders, or boundaries) and apply them to our case. In this fashion it will be possible to highlight some factors that can work for the integration of the region: the "international vocation" as a "bridge region" between Italy and the Danubian area, and between the Mediterranean and Mitteleuropa; and the presence of a Slovene minority.

The third and final part of the paper analyzes in some detail four problems emerging from the border position: the problem of ethnic and linguistic minorities, the (now largely superseded) problem of military presence, the

problem of cross-frontier relations and, finally, the problem of the infrastructures that should concretely realize the region's "bridge" doctrine.

I. Historical Background

1. The history of Friuli¹⁾

Friuli is a border region; better, it is a corner region. It lies at the tip of the northernmost stretch of the Adriatic Sea, where the Mediterranean meets the Alps and thrusts into Central Europe. In this area, three successive metropolises grew at the cross-roads and break-of bulk-point between the Mediterranean Sea-lanes and the central-European inland routes. Friuli is in many ways an outgrowth of the most ancient of these cities, Aquileia, but since 1420 has been dominated by the second one, Venice, and more recently by the third one, Trieste (fig. 1). Aquileia, one of the great metropolises of the Roman empire, continued to exercise religious authority over a large territory, and temporal power in an area from the Livenza river in the west to the Isonzo valley in the east, and most of Istria. But since the VI century, its territory had become fragmented in a German, a Latin and a Slavic culture area.

trickled down to the southern slope (Sauris, Timau). The Slavic population occupied the Julian Alps, from Kanaltal down to the Valleys of Resia, Torre, Natisone, Isonzo. The ethnic boundary was here sharply marked: the Slavic pastoral settlements in the highlands, the "Roman" farmers in the plains.

The western boundary of the region has no geographical basis; it is the outcome of political and cultural processes. The physical structure of the Friulian plain is not different from the Veneto and Po lowlands; the passes between the valleys of the rivers Piave in the Veneto and of Cellina and Tagliamento in Friuli are hardly an obstacle. A boundary emerged here because the Livenza happened to be chosen as the western boundary of the Lombard Duchy of Friuli (Friuli, Forum Juli, was the roman name of the town later called Civitas Austriae, i.e. the Eastern Town, now Cividale). Some local historians claim that there is an earlier ethnic basis for the choice of this boundary; allegedly, the area east of the Livenza river was already ethnically marked by a weaker Venetian influence and a stronger Celtic substratum.

Friuli was a strategically important duchy to the Lombard kingdom in Italy because it guarded the easy mountain passes in the Julian Alps against the Slavic and other peoples from the East.




Fig. 1: The successive metamorphosis of the Upper Adriatic

Entwicklungstendenz der oberen Adria

The water-shed between the Gail and the Tagliamento river basins separated quite sharply the Latin area, superimposed to an earlier Celtic substratum, from the German one; although later on German settlements

'Mark' means border, boundary, frontier; Friuli became then a Carolingian mark. One Markgraf of Friuli, Berengarius, became king of Italy in the Xth century. But in the dynastic struggles that ensued, free rein if not actual bait was reaching as far as Pavia, Milan and St. Gallen. The Saxon emperors determined not to allow such terror to be loosened again, and gradually established the Patriarchate of Aquileia as a feudal vassal state, immediately dependent from the emperor and

¹⁾ One of the best socio-geographical presentations of Friuli in other than Italian languages is by B. Prost, *Le Frioul, region d'affrontements*, Ophrys, Gap-Paris 1973. A basic bibliography is suggested in R. Strassoldo, B. Cattarinussi, eds., *Friuli: la prova del terremoto*, Angeli, Milano 1978.

strengthened by a string of fortifications manned by German nobility (Fig. 2).

Italy was then the "Giardin de l'imperio" – the golden and sunny country to which the great Emperors like Barbarossa and Frederick II were so devoted; no wonder they did their best to protect it from Eastern threats. But soon the geopolitical situation of Friuli was reversed. As Italy was lost to the Empire in the late middle ages, this corner came under the influence of Venice. The German-speaking ruling class, which ear-

separate identity as the "Patria del Friuli" but was reduced, in fact, to the typical state of frontier areas or even of "internal colonies"; (of which the "Militärgränze" of Croatia is perhaps the most famous example in European history). This situation lasted for almost four centuries. The XVI and XVII centuries were marked by a sequence of wars, turmoils, and famines which reduced the population to 130 000, in an area where 200 000 probably lived in Roman times and 800 000 are living in our days. Only in the XVIII century a lasting



Fig. 2: The Patronato di Aquileia, matrix of the Patria del Friuli

Das Patriarchat von Aquileia, das friaulische Ursprungsgebiet

lier had been instrumental in isolating Friuli from the developments of Italian culture, became culturally venetized and tuscanized; the fortunes of the Patriarchate ebbed with those of the Empire in Italy; by 1420, it was no match for the vigorous Venetian republic, and was swallowed, except for the County of Gorizia which was left in Austrian hands. Thus the land shifted role, from the Imperial gatekeeper of Italy to the Venetian frontier against the empire.

Friuli had for Venice mainly military interest. It was a frontier area, a buffer zone needed only to keep away potential enemies – the Austrians and the Turks – as far as possible from its home base. Venice was not interested in the economic development of Friuli; it checked its attempts to develop trade and industry, did not invest capitals in public works (save for the huge fortress of Palmanova), land reclamation and agricultural progress. It acted positively to keep Friuli as wild and natural as possible, in order to render it less attractive to competitors and as difficult to cross as possible. It did not modernize it socially and politically; the old feudal institutions were left standing, while effective authority was exercised by the "luogotenenti" and "provveditori"; the Friulian nobility had no word in the Venetian decision-making processes. Friuli kept its

peace, the spirit of enlightenment and the diffusion of the Venetian style of country-living triggered an upward evolution of economy and demography. After the Napoleonic period, Friuli, with the whole of Veneto, became the easternmost province of the Austrian Lombard-Venetian kingdom; but little was done to develop it, as though Austria did not feel it worthwhile to invest capitals in an obviously shaky domain. After the 1866 war, Friuli was annexed to Italy and was renamed Province of Udine; some efforts were expended by the new rulers to improve its structure; but centuries of backwardness could not be easily overcome. The population increased from 352 000 in 1795, to 459 000 in 1863 and to 780 000 in 1921; a sizeable part of Friulani, unable to live off the land, had to emigrate seasonally or permanently; one part found employment in industries and cities that had begun to grow at the turn of the century. But the frontier was hit again in a terrible way. World War I first transformed Friuli in a war operation area, and then, during the Caporetto rout, made scorched earth of it: 70 % of its industries were destroyed, countless buildings, many of which of historical value, were burned or dynamited, two years of crops failed, more than 100 000 refugees abandoned the land. With the Italian victory, Friuli ceased temporarily to be a

firstline region; the frontier had been pushed far into the Slovene highlands. For a couple of years, an attempt was made to establish a monstrous "province of Friuli" which comprised the solidly slovene Isonzo (Soca) and Vipacco (Vipava) valleys. For the first time a serious land reclamation project was launched in the Friulian floodplains.

But soon Friuli was caught again in the plight of frontier areas. Fascist Italy's harsh assimilation policies against the Slovene people, and the outright aggression against Yugoslavia (1941) backlashed in the following years, when it was the Yugoslav partizans' turn to claim all the Slavic-speaking territories, up to the Tagliamento-Torre-Judrio-Isonzo lines. The boundary threatened to swing back into the heart of Friuli (fig. 3). This threat deeply influenced the vicissitudes of the "Resistance" in this area, as Fascists could present themselves as defenders of national integrity, while communist partizans had to accept, at least tactically, the Yugoslav

Veneto were emphasized. It seemed likely that if the Nazi New Order had been established, this area would have again been detached from Italy and integrated, as in the Patriarchine and Habsburg times, into the German Reich (fig. 4).

2. The history of Trieste

At this point, however, the history of Friuli has to be linked up with the quite different history of Trieste. A prosperous Roman colony, during the middle ages Trieste was reduced to a fishing community within the Patriarchate; the language of her area was about the same as in the rest of Friuli. But her maritime character put her in early competition with Venice, ever jealous of other Adriatic ports; after a few struggles, in 1383 Trieste chose to surrender herself to the Emperor rather than to Venice. Nothing very noticeable happened for a few centuries, until, in early XVIII century, the site was




Fig. 3: Some past, proposed and present Eastern boundaries of Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Einige frühere, geplante und gegenwärtige Grenzen des Gebiets Friaul-Venezia Giulia

territorial claims. In between, democratic guerrillas had both to fight the fascist enemy and to ward off the ally's pretensions. This split led to bloody episodes and left an heritage of deep distrust. Another effect of the frontier in this area was the setting up of the 'Operations-gebiet Adriatisches Küstenland', which under the Austrian Gauleiter K. Reiner sought to revive the cultural and sentimental ties between the German speaking world and what had been the Habsburg Küstenland district; the economic interests of Trieste to be linked with Central Europe rather than with Italy were recalled, and the Friulian cultural identity and difference from

picked as the main seaport of the Habsburg domains; it was suddenly developed with large public works and the addition of two new districts, featuring a characteristically illuministic hothogonal ground plan (quartiere Teresiano, quartiere Giuseppino). Growing numbers of merchants, seamen and businessmen flocked in from the Adriatic and Eastern Mediterranean countries, as well as professionals, administrators and speculators from central Europe; soon there were prosperous Greek, Jew, Dalmatian, Serb, Croatian, Austrian and other communities, while the growing city attracted peasants from the surrounding Slovene hills

and from Istria. The native Friulian was overwhelmed, as early as the beginning of the XIX century, by a lingua franca of strong Venetian flavor. The material progress of the Habsburg Empire during the XIX century was immediately reflected and even anticipated in Trieste, which was soon reached by railroads from Vienne and became one of the biggest ports of the Mediterranean, the sea outlet of the whole industrializing Central Europe. Her population skyrocketed from 7000 in 1735 to 30 000 in 1800 and to 180 000 a century later.

The only "rational" explanation can be found in a sporadically expressed imperialist dream of Italian hegemony over Central European and Balkanic areas; Trieste could aspire to become the pivot of such a system.

In reality, her growth was suddenly stopped; the traffic stagnated and then declined; Trieste began to claim for economic compensations for her act of love. She was granted a large shipyard and a solemn university, stronghold of Italian nationalistic feelings. But the sup-




Fig. 4: 'Adriatisches Küstenland' (1944/45)

Though inhabited by a large variety of ethnic groups, Trieste remained predominantly Italian in culture. But her *raison d'être* was so obviously in her function for Central Europe that the cultural orientation did not become a political movement, save for a few romantic young upper-class "irredentists", for whom economic reasons were trivial in comparison with literary fascinations. This led to a characteristic "schizophrenia" of Trieste's soul. At the same time the alliance with the young Kingdom of Italy and the austro-hungarian monarchy silenced any Italian moves over Trieste. But with the hurricane of World War I, after four years of hammering propaganda, and with the old Habsburg state obviously falling into pieces, the crowds of Trieste greeted enthusiastically the annexation to Italy. The irredentist movements of Trieste, and the fact that the city opted for Italy have been sometimes subjected to a marxist analysis in term of class interest an economic determinants; but there seem to be few so clear falsifications of this type of analysis than in the Trieste case. Trieste had obviously nothing to gain from severing her lifeline with Central Europe and joining Italy, already full of harbours, among which in particular the old competitor, Venice. Trieste's dedication to Italy was completely "irrational", sentimental and idealistic.

pression of Slavic minorities left a heritage of hatred that erupted after the war, when for 40 days the city was occupied by Tito's partisans, and mass murderings took place. The city also had the grim privilege to house the only Nazi extermination camp south of the Alps (the Risiera di San Sabba). In 1947 Trieste was flooded by about 350 000 refugees from Istria and Dalmatia, that the Paris treaty had given to Yugoslavia, and became the permanent home of tens of thousands of them, whose hatred for the "conquerors", hysteric nationalism and grief for the lost homes strengthened in Trieste a characteristic right-wing political mood.

The 1945 cease-fire had left the Italian-Yugoslav boundary unsettled. A demarcation line was provisionally traced by the Allied forces, running through Gorizia and at the outskirts of Trieste. Both these cities were claimed by Yugoslavia, backed by the Soviet Union; Italy wanted to keep them and a reasonable hinterland: the Allies were cautiously suggesting compromise lines; Italian communists wavered between national solidarity and loyalty to the Kremlin. Then in 1948 Tito was excommunicated by Stalin, and Italian communists could side with the rest of the nation; at the same time, the Allies tried to encourage Tito's independent stand. So Trieste, which according to a U.N. resol-

ution of 1947 was supposed to be set up as a free city-state and was provisionally governed by an Anglo-American Military Government, was promised to Italy, while almost all its hinterland was handed over to Yugoslavia. The situation dragged on among diplomatic bluffs and skirmishes in that sideshow of the Cold War commonly known as the Conflict of Trieste, until in 1954 the interested parties agreed (London Memorandum) to let Trieste join Italy, while the B zone remained in an uncertain status, under Yugoslav administration. Such uncertainty complicated for years Italian-Yugoslav relations, with occasional outbursts of tensions. Only twenty years later, after a spectacular improvement of Italian-Yugoslav relations in the economic and political spheres, the times were judged ripe for a formal acknowledgment of the *de facto* situation, and the Treaty of Osimo (1975) put an end to the border dispute.

however still does not satisfy those who project for Trieste a more dignified industrial and tertiary or even "quaternary" future. The city, as it has long struggled to find her cultural and national identity, has been struggling for almost 60 years to find an economic and functional identity, in substitution of the original one, destroyed with the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy.²⁾

3. History of Friuli-Venezia Giulia

The term 'Venezia Giulia' was coined in 1863 by the Gorizian scholar, G. A. Ascoli, for a frankly acknowledged irredentist purpose: to make a symbolic appropriation to Italy, by means of a name recalling the Roman (Giulia) and Venetian heritage of the lands that the Habsburgs had ruled for many centuries under the names of County of Gorizia and Gradisca, City of Trieste,




Fig. 5: The four provinces of Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Die vier Provinzen des Gebiets
Friaul-Venezia Giulia

The Austrian heritage, the perspective of becoming a Free State, the protracted Allied Military government, and finally some delusions of the return to Italy have moulded in a unique way the soul of this city. Thousands migrated, specially to Australia; skilled and professional workers had to seek jobs in other areas of booming Italy. At the same time, other immigrants from Friuli and Southern Italy came to fill the lower echelons of the occupational structure. In the sixties new ways were sought to revitalize its industrial and trading sectors, but the largest economic help came from the lowering of the economic barriers with Yugoslavia in the late fifties and the rapid development of a lively small-scale, small range, retail commerce, now estimated to run up to 150 billion lire yearly. This unexpected bounty

and Mark of Istria (also collectively known as Küstenland, Litorale or Primorje). The term caught hold both among the learned and among the irredentists; but it was officially used for the first time only in 1919.

In the aftermath of World War II, the Italian Republic was given a regional structure, and a number of regions with special autonomy were created at the periphery: Sicily, Sardinia, Aosta Valley and Trentino-South Tyrol. A thorny issue was raised over the status of the north-

²⁾ The literature on Trieste in foreign languages is substantial, but mostly focusing on the "conflict"; see J. B. Duroselle, *Le conflit de Trieste, 1943-45*, Inst. de Sociologie de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1966; B. Novak, *Trieste 1941-1954, The Ethnic, Political and Ideological Struggle*, University of Chicago Press, 1970; F. Gross, *Ethnicity in a Borderland*, Greenwood Press, Westport (Connect.), 1978.

eastern corner. Several groups demanded special autonomy for Friuli; others were suspicious of it, mindful of the events of '44-'45 (the Nazi-Küstenland and the Yugoslavian claims). Above all, there was the issue of the unsettled boundaries and of the destiny of Trieste. So it seemed wise to state, as early as in 1947, the claim over Gorizia, Trieste and Istria; and to integrate them solidly, if only platonically for the time being, to the Friulian hinterland. Thus the Region Friuli-Venezia Giulia was brought to life in the Italian Constitution (1948). However, its actual realization came only fifteen years later (1963), after Trieste had been retrieved (fig. 5), and after the antiregionalist mood of the fifties had been dispelled. The name was maintained, even though the so-called Venezia Giulia was reduced to a tiny sterile morsel of Carsic plateau over Trieste. The inappropriateness of the name has become quite evident since the Osimo treaty has definitively canceled all lingering Italian claims over the rest of "Venezia Giulia". The cohabitation of Friuli and Trieste were fraught with tensions from the beginning.

Friuli, as we have seen, is land-locked (the coastal plains have been marshy up to our days and almost depopulated, except for three fishing villages of paleo-Venetian, not Friulian language); Trieste is a harbour city. Friuli has long been utterly rural and agricultural, Trieste is a proud and splendid metropolis; Friuli has long been a military frontier and an economic periphery, Trieste has been an economic frontier, i.e. a cross-roads, a place of intense and rapid growth; Friuli has a long and harsh history, that welded it in a solidly homogeneous ethnic group; Trieste is a Nouveau Riche, whose dazzling career did not give her time enough to fully assimilate her various ethnic components; in particular the massive immigration from the surrounding Slovene hinterland created a cleavage between this group and the dominant Italian one.

More recently, Friuli has become an area of small private industries, thriving on abundant local human resources; Trieste has attracted large, state-owned industries; more recently still, as mentioned, it has become a retail-trade center with a market area reaching deep into the Balkans. Friuli is more interested in relations with Austria, Trieste with Yugoslavia.

A large number of factors then are at the basis of tensions between the two components of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia region. They creep into the political processes and erupt periodically; the first symptom of the uneasy cohabitation was the 1965 demonstration for the Friulian University, in which a large student movement rallied wide sympathies in Friuli; an outcrop of this was the creation of the Movimento Friuli, which won a remarkable share of suffrages at the 1968 regional elections. The University has remained a symbol of cultural resurgence and autonomy, seen as a prerequisite to economic and social progress.³⁾

The earthquake of 1976 gave Friuli a unique opportu-

ity to exhibit all its ancient pains and an overwhelming argument in favor of its claims; while at the same time the Osimo agreement plunged Trieste in a vicious intestine strife between supporters and opposers of the project of a huge industrial free zone, jointly created and administered by Italy and Yugoslavia on the Carso plateau just over Trieste.⁴⁾ This two strong opposite centrifugal forces, for an historical accident, were unleashed precisely at the same point in history, with results yet to be seen. The political class is almost solidly, if perhaps only officially, in favor of the continuing cohabitation; but talks of an "articulated region", with two separate components, after the fashion of Trento and Bolzano, are heard ever more frequently.

Of course there are good arguments for unity. The strongest one is probably administrative inertia; the process of divorce would take very long, and perhaps costly, procedures unwelcome to Rome. The second is that Trieste has neither the physical space nor the manpower to grow according to her plans; she needs Friuli as a manpower reservoir and an outlet for its plants. This of course is a perspective which many Friulians challenge. The more serious interdependence between Trieste and Friuli concerns the infrastructures. The rail-, road-, gas-, oil-, and other networks that integrate Trieste with her new economic spaces have to run mostly through Friulian territory; their creation and improvement is of common interest. The representatives of Friuli-Venezia Giulia have been unanimous in pressuring the central government to build and improve those infrastructures. A common ideology was also elaborated: that of the "Bridge region", the region whose special function to the Italian system is to organize the exchanges with central Europe and the Balkans. Such ideology, in fact, is more germane to the Triestine trading tradition, than to the Friulian one of production in the primary and secondary sectors; but it is not entirely alien to the latter, as to any corner-region. A third integrating factor, of uncertain and controversial weight, has been indicated in the presence of Slovene minorities both in "Venezia Giulia" and in Friuli (Benecija).

What remains to be seen is whether political-administrative inertia, the common ideology of the "bridge region", and the minority issue will prove strong enough to hold the region together, after the events of 1976 have laid bare the psychological diversity, the weak solidarity and the diverging interests of Friuli and Trieste.

B. The meaning of the Border situation: concepts and problems

Border regions share a number of common features and problems, which have been the subject of growing interest in Europe and the U.S. in the last few years. Many learned symposia, studies and publications have

³⁾ A moderately "Friulanistic" account of the tensions between Friuli and Trieste can be found in G. Ellero, *Storia dei Friulani*, Arti Grafiche Friulane, Udine 1977.

⁴⁾ Pio Nodari, *Der Vertrag von Osimo* "Österreichische Osthefte", XIX, 3, 1977.

dealt with such "problematique".⁵⁾ Border regions can be distinguished into two classes, corresponding to the basic ambiguity of the boundary, which at the same time separates and unites, repels and attracts, closes and opens. This ambiguity is nicely expressed by the Latin terms of *limes* and *limen*, and the parallel Italian terms *barriera* and *cerniera*; the *limes* is the limit, the dividing line, the defensive and hostile barrier, the wall; the *limen* is the opening, the crossroad, the door, the junction, the hinge (*cerniera*). The two functions of the boundary can be unified in the concept of *selection* (filtering); the function of the boundary to the bounded system is to control, select and filter the exchanges with the environment, according to the instructions, interests, values and strategies of the system. A general theory of boundaries can be developed as a *pendant* of the general theory of systems. Such theory could be of particular value in suggesting analytical categories and concepts for the systematic study of the problems of border regions.⁶⁾

Two useful conceptual couples have been developed, specially in the English-speaking world.

The first is *frontier/boundary*, and twilights the difference between the *area* of expansion, the growing edge of a system (frontier) and the limiting, binding, closing line (boundary). It points to a dialectic between the dynamic, vital forces of growth, that operate in a *field* or extended area, and are open to the exchanges with the environment; and the trends toward precise delimitation, fine separation, rational distinction, mechanical marking whose spatial expression is a *line*. It has been suggested that the general trend of societal change, germane to those of centralization, rationalization, modernization etc. is the trend from frontiers to boundaries.⁷⁾

The second is *frontier/periphery*. It points not to the spatial but to the socio-economic characteristics of border areas. The frontier is open attractive, beckoning and growing. On the contrary, the periphery is a part of a social system which is outlying and with "its shoulder to the wall" of a closed boundary; there are no exchanges with the environment, and therefore no attractive power; the periphery repels.⁸⁾ Modern societies have generally overcome the frontier in the

first sense; precise boundary lines have been established between their territorial jurisdictions. These have fluctuated through the centuries according to the changing relations of power between the neighboring states (boundaries as balance-of-power lines) and usually have been settled by the force of arms, negotiations and dynastic vicissitudes. In this sense, border regions have suffered more than any other because of the division of Europe into Nation-States; they have often been the battlefields of clashing national armies that have decimated their populations and destroyed their towns; they are often still handicapped by military restrictions on civilian activities. They have been at the forefront of economic, cultural and ideological cold wars; autarchic and protectionistic policies have choked their market and trade relations; strategic reasons have hindered investments and industrial developments in their exposed areas; their transport network has been twisted and thwarted by the requirements of national defence, as geographers have long noted. Regional diversity, suppressed in all States in the interests of "unity", has been most severely fought in border areas, because here it was felt to be especially dangerous; denationalization, forced assimilation and other "crimes against cultural diversity" have been committed on a large scale, and the building of artificial differentiation in naturally homogeneous transfrontier regions has been pursued with determination; suspicions of weak patriotism have sometimes resulted in exaggerated nationalism, distrust and hatred between populations on opposite sides of a frontier; sometimes border populations have been played up against each other for expansionistic purposes. The erratic vicissitudes of international relations, of wars, of dynastic arrangements and negotiations have caused frequent changes in boundaries and forced shifts of allegiance, with the ensuing problems of psychological, cultural, institutional, economic adaptation.

Thus areas lying along the boundaries of nation-states have often been frontiers in the military sense (fronts), but not in the socio-cultural and economic meaning of the terms; in this sense, they are usually marginal and peripheral areas. This descends from some general laws of societal systems, such as centralization, which is another word for growing systemness. In market economies a "dual pattern" of development has been discovered, whereby the growth of the Center is only possible at the expense of the Periphery; and this dialectics reproduces itself at every systemic level, from the town to the world system.⁹⁾ Marginal areas are handicapped by distance from the seats of power: distance *both* in the geographical and economic (time/cost) meaning, *and* in the symbolic-cultural ones (alienation). When the neighboring country is perceived as threatening, investments are further deterred.

Some characteristics of the "economic frontier" model set in when the neighboring systems interact at some selected points (border passes). Here border town usu-

⁵⁾ P. Romus (ed.), *Les régions frontalières Européennes à l'heure du Marché Commun*, Presses de l'Université Libre de Bruxelles, 1971; R. Strassoldo (ed.), *Boundaries and regions*, Lint. Trieste 1973; V. v. Malchus, *Partnerschaft auf Europäische Grenzen*, Europa Union Verlag, Bonn 1975; AIEE, *Les régions transfrontalières de l'Europe*, Colloque de Genève, 1975; R. Grinker (ed.), *Toward a unified theory of human behavior*, Basic Books, New York 1956.

⁶⁾ R. Strassoldo, *The study of boundaries, a systems-oriented, multidisciplinary, bibliographical essay*, "Jerusalem Journal of International Relations", v. 2, n. 3, Spring 1977.

⁷⁾ L. Kristof, *The nature of frontiers and boundaries*, "Annals of the Association of American Geographers", XLIX, 1959. R. Weatherhead and his associates use the antinomy frontier-border in a similar sense; see his foreword to S. R. Ross, *Views across the border*, University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque 1978.

⁸⁾ One of the most authoritative statements of this antinomy is by J. Friedmann and W. Alonso, *Regional development and planning*, MIT Press, 1969. It has been elaborated in several papers of the present author; see f. instance R. Strassoldo, *Center/periphery and System/boundary: culturological perspectives*, in J. Gottman (ed.), *Center and Periphery*, Cambridge University Press (forthcoming).

⁹⁾ J. Galtung, *A structural theory of imperialism*, "Journal of Peace Research", 8, 1971.

ally develop in pairs, across the border (twin towns) and they attract activities and persons linked both with the control function (military personnel, customs officers, etc.) and with the exchange itself; often transport and trading extends beyond legality, and contraband flourishes. The smuggler is as characteristic a feature of human landscape in border areas as the soldier. A certain lawlessness is a common characteristic of frontier and border areas; it is due to in the first case to the weakness of central control, in the second to psychological marginality, weakened loyalty, cultural heterogeneity that leads to the relativization of standards and norms, and finally to the liberating effects of "going abroad". Differing moral standards between neighboring countries explain the concentration, in border towns, of activities and services less available on the other side of the border; such as sometimes gambling and prostitution. Often economic differentials and burgeoning economy in border areas attract flows of workers from the neighboring state; there can be daily commuting or more permanent immigration; both can be welcome and legalized, or opposed and illegal. Usually business interests favor commuting and immigration, while civic, political and tradeunion interests are against it, because of the 1) social costs of checking, maintaining, accommodating and servicing such immigrants; 2) change in the cultural and ethnic composition of the border area, with the ensuing problems of moral standards, political representation, etc. 3) competition with local workers.¹⁰⁾

Border regions usually exhibit a mixture of features typical of the "frontier" and the "periphery" situations, for at least three reasons. In the first place, they are the result of an *history*, during which the boundary line usually shifted both in location and in function, according to the changing relationships between the neighboring societies. Geographically, they have been sometimes fallen completely within one side, and in other times perhaps have formed a semi-independent buffer or gate-keeper political entity of their own.

Functionally, the boundary has been more or less closed and hostile, or open and friendly; times of nationalist rivalry have been succeeded by times of socio-economic cooperation. The effects of such experiences on the physical landscape, on settlement patterns, on social and cultural characteristics outlive their causes, due to the normal inertia of human phenomena.

In the second place, stability or mobility of the boundary, as well as its openness and closure, are a matter of degree. The perfect frontier and the perfect periphery are ideal-types that rarely occur; most real border situations show a mixture of the traits typical of each.

Thirdly, modern societies regulate their boundaries so as to channel cross-border interactions through border passes, where the flows can easily be checked, while keeping closed the stretches between them. Border

regions are "peripheries" along the closed sections, and "frontiers" at the points of crossing. It may be added that usually a hierarchy of border passages is established, which limits the range of flows that are admitted in each of them, so that a boundary line is open or closed also with reference to the *type* of interaction.

These considerations apply also to Friuli-Venezia Giulia, as suggested in the preceding historical account. The wealth and range of border-related problems is very wide. In the next part of the paper we shall deal with a few of them.

C. Border problems in Friuli-Venezia Giulia

1. Ethnic and linguistic problems

a) Friulians

Like most border regions, Friuli and Trieste are characterised by ethnic diversity; indeed, this has been one of the main reasons for the setting up of the Region with special autonomy. The largest group are the Friulians (Furlàns, Germ. Friauler, Sl. Furlanski, Ital. Friulani) whose language differs to the point of un-intelligibility from that of neighboring Veneti. The causes of this difference have been variously ascribed to a Celtic *substratum*, which for some reasons was not romanized completely, and emerged again with the fall of Rome; or to the unique combination of Celtic, Roman, and Lombard cultures; or to the isolation from the rest of Italy, due to the German character of the Patriarchate in the formative centuries.¹¹⁾ This language is closely related to the Ladino of the Dolomites and the Romansch of Grisons, so that a solid Ladino culture area, stretching in early middle ages along the Alps, from Switzerland to Trieste, has been hypothesized. Friulian language has been used in administrative and literary documents since the XIII century, but in a subordinate role to Latin, to the Veneto-Tuscan and finally to the Italian languages. Being mainly a spoken language of a peasant population, it shows many local variations and dialects. Through the centuries it has been eroded at the margins and in the urban centres (Udine, Pordenone, Gorizia) to the advantage of Veneto and Tuscan (Italian). Today, it is caught in the middle of two contradictory processes. At a mass level, it is being threatened of "italianization" by mass-media and mass education, and in general, by the advent of modernization, i.e. centralization and bureaucratization; at an elite level, we find also in Friuli the upsurge of interest in ethnic traditions and regional cultures that is characteristic of contemporary Europe.¹²⁾ A growing number of intellec-

¹¹⁾ D. B. Gregor, *Friulian language and literature*, Olander, New York 1975. G. Francescato, M. Salimbeni, *Storia, lingua e società in Friuli*, Casamassima, Udine 1977.

¹²⁾ R. Petrella, *Les régions et l'Europe*, Bruxelles 1976 (Mimeo); G. Heraud, *L'Europe des Ethnies*, Presses d'Europe, Paris 1965; id., *Peuples et langues d'Europe*, Denoel, Paris 1968.

¹⁰⁾ Border towns of this kind have been studied especially along the US-Mexico boundary; see the literature cited in S. Ross, op. cit. (supra, n. 7).

tuals is active in the defense of such traditions, of which the language is the most evident expression; literary societies, groups of clergymen, and even political parties are claiming recognition of Friulian as an official language, to be used in media, in schools, in administrative proceedings. Several bills have been presented recently to this effect in the Italian parliament.¹³⁾

Which of these two processes shall prevail is uncertain. It may be argued that the Italianization of Friuli is proceeding at a lower speed than expected. A recent survey on a sample of 1500 citizens of the region has shown that, of the roughly 700 000 inhabitants of the Friulian area, about half still speak Friulian with their children; while almost three-quarters of the older generation did (or does) and 64 % speak Friulian with their spouses. This indicates an average of 11 % loss of usage at every generation. The same survey indicates also a wide support (80 %) to the use of Friulian in schools, as a subject-matter or as an instruction language.

Language is, however, only one aspect of a culture. Attempts have been made to identify other sources of Friulian solidarity and integrations, and these have been indicated in the common history and common environment, both marked, as we have seen, by uncommon harshness; as Vidal de la Blache says of Eastern France "*les coups répétés... ont forgé d'un métal solide le temperament de ce peuple*".¹⁴⁾

b) Slovenes

The second characterizing ethnic group are the Slovenes, which have settled the Eastern highlands, from Tarvis to Trieste, since the late VI century. Lacking a common integrating urban centre this side of the Alps, they have been caught in the separate influence areas of Udine, Cividale, Gorizia and Trieste; they have differentiated in many ways through the centuries and are still subjected to rather different regimes. The Slovenes of the Valcanale and Tarvis have successively been partly germanized and friulanized, and only with difficulty their ethnic identity is re-emerging. The Slovenes of the narrow valleys draining towards Udine and Cividale have kept separate cultural and linguistic identities, but never questioned their political allegiance to the powers of the plains; their homeland is collectively known as Venetian Slovenia (Benecija). They were until recently a solidly rural, pastoral and pious people, deeply loyal to their parsons and hence to the Bishop of Udine. Centuries of isolation and acceptance of Venetian and then Italian political-cultural hegemony have effectively suppressed in these people, down to our days, any idea of special treatment and minority status.

A third group of Slovenes lives in and around Gorizia, making up about 13 % of its population. The county of Gorizia was a multiethnic political organism, with a delicate and shifting balance between the four components: a Slovene rural population in the eastern basins of Isonzo and Vipacco; a Friulian rural population in the plains of Cormons and Gradisca; an Italian urban upper class of professionals and businessmen; and finally an aristocracy and officialdom of German descent. German and Italian were supplemented, during the XIX century, by Slovene (and even, sporadically, Friulian) as official languages, and growing protection was given to the Slovene culture. The basically bi-lingual nature of the county of Gorizia was brutally negated when Gorizia was annexed to Italy and fell under the Fascist nationalistic regime. After the second world war the Gorizian Slovenes recovered some of their traditional rights; both their cultural, social and economic position is still worse, in comparative terms, than under Austria. Finally, there is a strong Slovene minority in Trieste, which enjoys a better treatment because of the internationalization of their position, first under the Military government and then under the terms of the London memorandum (1954), by which Italy agreed to respect certain minority rights.

An estimate of the number of Slovenes in Friuli-Venezia Giulia is very difficult not only because of the different definitions and criteria, but also because of the varying degrees of ethnic identification and cultural-political mobilization. Proposed figures range from a minimum of 53 000 to a maximum of 125 000. A census of the Slovene minorities is opposed by their political leaders, who contend that any trace of discrimination, repression and prejudice has to be removed *before* any census, so as to recreate the conditions for the recovery of ethnic conscience and to remove the obstacles to free expression of ethnic self-identification. Sample surveys conducted by ISIG (1971) suggest that about 13 % of the people in the provinces of Gorizia and Trieste area broadly Slovene; which would give about 58 320; the slovene speaking citizens of the province of Udine were about 15 000 (1971). Altogether then the Slovene minority along the Italian-Yugoslav border would be 73 000 strong. Minority leaders, of course, claim that the population of Slovene stock is much larger.

The Slovene minority is divided not only administratively, but also ideologically. The proximity of the Socialist republic of Slovenia has different effects on marxists and non-marxists in the minority. Communist and socialist ("red") slovenes are represented by the corresponding Italian parties that have adopted bilingual denominations. In particular the PSI (Italian Socialist Party) is predominantly Slovene in Trieste and Gorizia; while Catholic and Liberal ("white") Slovenes have mostly preferred to be represented by their own ethnic party, the Slovene Union, which in 1974 got 10 000 votes.

Slovenes in Gorizia and Trieste have their own schools and cultural institutions, such as theatres, newspapers and publishing houses; they have strong associations, and their economic standing is improving markedly,

¹³⁾ Among the intellectual "clapis" (clubs) more energetic in promoting studies and publications and other activities in and on Friulian we may mention, besides the official "Società Filologica Friulana" (SFF), the "Clape Cultural Ermete di Colloret" and the "Clape Cultural Aquilee". The periodicals more useful in order to be informed on such initiatives are "Ce Fastu" and "Sot la Nape", both published by the SFF, the "Corriere del Friuli", "Friuli d'oggi" (expression of the Movimento Friuli) and the journals of the dioceses of Udine, "La Vita Cattolica", and Gorizia, "Voce Isontina".

¹⁴⁾ Citation borrowed from B. Prost, op. cit. (supra, n. 1), p. 37.

also to the growth of trade with neighboring Slavic tries. But socio-economic differentials still persist; assimilation processes are steadily at work; grounds for complaints therefore abound. Slovenes strive for a "package" of global protection of the minority after the South-Tyrol example.¹⁵⁾

Germans

The third ethnic-linguistic component of Friuli-Venezia Giulia is a tiny minority of perhaps 2–3 thousand odd Germans in a few Alpine settlements, of mere ethnolinguistic interest.¹⁶⁾

Venetians

The fourth linguistic component is a mixellany of various Venetian dialects. The most ancient one is spoken in the fishing villages of Grado and Marano; the province of Pordenone has been venetized, after the Venetian conquest, in its western rim and in the town itself; various dialects of Veneto are spoken by the middle and upper classes of Udine and Gorizia, while in Trieste a sort of dialect has become the *lingua franca* among the several ethnic groups, at all social levels. A final variety of dialect is spoken in the Monfalcone area; according to current hypotheses, this dialect is a venetized version of the Friulian.

Other

Finally there is the trickle of immigrants from the rest of Italy and especially from the South. This inflow was particularly strong in Trieste at the turn of the century. Southerners have also been attracted by the industrial centers, Pordenone and Monfalcone. In the proper migration channels have been those of administrative origin; in particular, schools and the armed forces. An association of the 4000 Sardinian immigrants has been recently founded in Udine.

Socio-linguistic study

Various Venetian and other Italian dialects are close to standard Italian and have not stimulated, so far, official aspirations for recognition, protection, and development. Their presence is rather a complicating factor in the institutionalization of Friulian, because it would require either the cutting up of Friulian provinces into those parts where Friulian is predominantly spoken and those where it is only a minority language; or the recognition of Friulian as a school and administrative language on communities which have been partly venetized.

In the fall of 1977 a socio-linguistic sample survey was

material on the Slovene minority is abundant; among the basic documentary sources one can cite the daily "Primorsky Dnevnik" and some periodicals, like "Dan", the bilingual "Most" and the "Bolno d'informazione degli Sloveni in Italia". The Minority also has an institute for socio-economic research, SLORI (Slovensko Raziskovalni Inštitut) which publishes many studies. Among the most scholarly and updated sources is the official *Slovinci v Italiji*, edited by an editorial board chaired by Janko Jeri, Ljubljana 1975. Denison, *Sauris: a trilingual community in diatypic perspective*, Trieste, 1, 4, Dec. 1968.

carried out in the whole Friuli-Venezia Giulia, focusing on linguistic attitudes, values and behaviors of the four main groups – Friulian, Slovene, German and Venetian, whose language has hitherto no recognition or tutelage. Over 1500 citizens were administered a complex questionnaire; the data are still under analysis (fig. 6). But the first results point to a remarkable degree of ethnic and linguistic conscience among the Friulians; almost half of them (44,4 %) maintain that Friulian is or should be used in all social situations and in meetings of various sorts; the percentage drops to 26.9 of the "Venetians" and 13.8 of the Slovenes of Benecija, Friulian is considered as the "own language" by 74.5 of the residents in the Friulian area, but also by sizeable percentages in other areas, where Friulian plays the role of a "subdominant" language, after Italian. All language groups are overwhelmingly in favour of introduction of their own language in the local schools; but while Friulians and Slovenes think it improper to address foreigners in the local language, Venetians do not, because of the similarity of this dialect to Italian.

Inter-ethnic relations

The relationships among the several ethnic groups in Friuli-Venezia Giulia are generally good. Whatever tensions have broken out in the past, have generally been the consequence of administrative policies and political manipulation by the Central state.¹⁷⁾ Sometimes and partly, ethnic tensions have been expressed in ideological contrasts, and or viceversa; this is the case of the Italian upper classes and Slovene lower classes in Trieste and Gorizia. But no noticeable tensions have ever developed between Friulians and Slovenes (and local Germans); which can be also explained by the commonality of socio-economic position (mainly lower class, peasants and workers) but also by the lack of interaction. Traditional rural communities are largely self-contained.

This issue was the object of several studies by the ISIG. In 1969 a sample of 677 young people, aged 18–26, of the provinces of Trieste, Gorizia and the Eastern portions of the province of Udine, was administered a battery of questions (a Bogardus scale) on ethnic attitudes.¹⁸⁾ Almost 20 % would have no objections to marrying or accept as personal friends people of the other (Slovene or Italian) group. The relations are particularly good in the prov. of Gorizia (90.3 %, no objections); then in Udine (82.2 %); finally in Trieste (75.4 %). Ethnocentrismo correlates positively with educational level and economic standard. Lower classes are less conscious of ethnic and national differentials.

In 1970–71 a survey was carried out in the border provinces of Gorizia and Trieste.¹⁹⁾ Three samples, of 400 each, were interviewed (all age groups). Among the 96


¹⁷⁾ F. Gross, *World Politics and tension areas*, New York University Press 1966; id. *Ethnics in a Borderland*, Greenwood Press, Westport (Connect.) 1978.

¹⁸⁾ F. Demarchi, P. Grasso, S. Orvati (eds.), *Gioventù '70 nel Friuli-Venezia Giulia*, Trieste 1971.

¹⁹⁾ R. Gubert, *La situazione confinaria*, Lint, Trieste 1972.

Fig. 6: Language areas of Friuli-Venezia Giulia (schematic survey)

Sprachgebiete in Friaul-Venezia Giulia (schematische Übersicht)



RAPPRESENTAZIONE SCHEMATICA
DELLE AREE CAMPIONATE

N = universo

n = campione

□ = 2.000 unità

Translation of the text in figure 6:

A. tedesca = German area

A. slava = Slavic area

Area slovene non considerate = Slovenian areas no polled

A. Friulana = Friulian area

A. Veneta = Venetian area

N = Universo = N = universe

n = campione = n = sample

2.000 unità = 2.000 units

Übersetzung:

deutsches Gebiet

slawisches Gebiet

slovenisches, nicht

berücksichtigtes Geb

friaulisches Gebiet

venetianisches Gebi

Gesamtzahl

Stichprobenzahl

Einheiten

questions, some concerned ethnic relations. It was asked whether the respondent had many, some, few or no personal *acquaintances* in the other ethnic group. These are the result (in percentage):

many	19
some	23
few	20
none	38
	<hr/> 100

It was also asked whether the respondent had personal *friends* belonging to the other group:

all or almost all	2
good part	11
small part	20
none	67
	<hr/> 100

The question was made about *relatives* of the other ethnic group: 79 % have none.

Questions were raised on the willingness to have *business relations* with members of the other group.

very often	8
rather often	4
sometimes	4
seldom	3
never	81
	<hr/> 100

It was asked whether the respondent felt able to *recognize at first sight* a member of another ethnic group. These are the findings:

always	24
very often	23
rather often	21
sometimes	16
never or nearly never	16
	<hr/> 100

This question was followed by another one, concerning the criteria of identification. Most people think they can tell a member of another ethnic group by cultural and behavioral traits; very few base their judgement on "racial", "biological", physical features.

The majority of people see no (60%) or only some (26%) *causes of contrast* between Italians and Slovenes. Only 10% see many or quite a few such causes. 11% indicate "political" conflicts and another 11% indicate "territorial" ones.

A crucial issue concerned the introduction of *bilingualism* in official acts and public offices.

strongly agree	20
agree	26
indifferent	21
rather disagree	12
strongly disagree	20
	<hr/> 100

An attempt was made to measure the "*ethnic cohesion*" through the following indicators:

"One should patronize preferably commercial enterprises belonging to people of the own ethnic group".

These are the data:

strongly agree	22
agree	13
undecided	29
disagree	9
strongly disagree	27
	<hr/> 100


Finally we tried to measure the *stereotypes and prejudices* ethnics have toward each other. We analyzed these "heterostereotypes" according to the "evaluation" factor, the "power" factor and the "activity" factor. The happy finding was that the "heterostereotypes" are neutral or positive in the large majority of cases.

This issue has been subjected to a much deeper analysis in a later research.²⁰⁾ In summer 1973, 11 selected ethnic communities were surveyed, for a total of 1100 interviews. Among other things, they were asked to name the most "threatening" or "hostile" of the other groups. Of the 489 Slovenes interviewed, 89 did not feel there was such a group; 265 named several "Italian" groups; 53 named Friulians, and 49 the Germans (by which probably they meant the Nazis, more than the inhabitants of Sauris and Timau). These data must be taken with caution, as the interviewers were explicitly asked to think about the matter; it is unclear how deep such identifications of the hostile group go. Of the 140 Friulians, 68 refused to identify any hostile group; 37 named the Italians, 25 the Slovenes; 10 the Germans. In conclusion, while ethnic tensions have caused open, and sometime bloody, conflicts in the first part of this century, they to-day have no deep roots in the common people of this corner area of Europe. They were largely the result of minipulation from the Center, of brutal assimilationist and expansionist policies in the past. The Slovene minority is rapidly recovering, in rights if not in numbers, from fascist repression, and is now looking after the rescue of the Slovene heritage of the valleys of the province of Udine. The Friulian people is currently experiencing at the same time a long wave of Italianization and more confused, but very lively fluctuations of ethnic conscience at the elite level. The earthquake seems to have given a powerful thrust to the valorization of Friulian identity. Which of the two trends will prevail in the long run is uncertain; in part, it depends of the fate of other regional cultures, in Italy and in the rest of Europe. If the current interest for the revitalization of minority groups, ethnic cultures, "lesser nations" and "outlawed nations" gets official recognition in the State policies, Friulians will have much better chances to survive; it is interesting that they are already fashioning their requests after those of the Slovenes, who at their turn look at the example of the South Tyroleans.

²⁰⁾ A. M. Boileau, E. Sussi, *Dominanza e minoranza nel Friuli-Venezia Giulia: le immagini reciproche*, in "Studi Goriziani", v. XLI, 1971.

2. The problem of trans-frontier exchanges and cooperation

In nationalist days, border regions were conceived not only as strongholds and barriers and thus hostile environments, but also as "outposts", "lighthouses" and



Translation of the text in fig. 7: Übersetzung:

weak	strong	stark	schwach
passive	active	passiv	aktiv
sad	cheerful	traurig	fröhlich
inconstant	persevering	unbeständig	zielbewußt, zäh
traditional	modern	traditionsgebunden	modern
superficial	deep	oberflächlich	tief
reserved	open	zurückhaltend	offen
crooked	honest	gerieben	ehrenhaft
lazy	hard-working	faul	fleißig
spendthrift	thrifty	nicht sparsam	sparsam
talkative	taciturn	gesprächig	schweigsam
domineering	docile	herrschaftlich	unterwürfig
Sloveni Torre N.	Slovenes from Torre and Natisone valleys		
Sloveni Resia	Slovenes from Resia valley		
Friulani	Friulians		
Triestini	Triestini		

"show-cases" of national culture, beaming into the "barbarian" outside to impress and attract.²¹⁾

Some of these aspects still obtain; but the growth of transnational integration encourages a different view of border regions as "junctions" "crossroads" and

"bridges" working toward the integration and cooperation of neighboring nations. Border regions play down their different political allegiance and stress commonalities in history, language, culture, landscape, and character. Regions on opposite sides of the border realize to have much interests in common, and both complain of the respective Centres' encroachments. They regard themselves as transition zones, buffer zones, middlemen zones to mediate the opposing interests of the neighboring states. Suppressing their ancient mutual distrust and sometimes heightened nationalism, they become the spearheads of transnational integration and cooperation. The desire to cancel old threats and crimes elicits the blooming of cross-border encounters, festivals, cultural events, exchanges of symbols of good will, and official commissions.

This happens to a certain extent in all border areas in Western Europe.²²⁾ It assumes a particular flavor in Friuli-Venezia Giulia for two reasons. One is that here meet the three main European stocks: Latin, German, Slavic. The second is that the three countries involved belong to different socio-economic and political systems. Austria and Italy have a more or less "market" and "social-democratic" regimes, Yugoslavia a socialist and planned one. Italy is in the NATO and the EEC, Austria and Yugoslavia are not. Thus, if cooperation among border regions is not easy within the EEC countries, and within western Europe, it is even less so in the "Alpe-Adria" region, made up by the Land Carinthia (Austria) the republics of Slovenia and part of Croatia (Yugoslavia) and the Region Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Italy). This cross-border region has three focuses. One is the ancient unity in pre-roman times, when Carnuti, a Celtic tribe, settled this region, and left their name to Carnia (the Alpine part of Friuli) and to Kranj (Carniola, the alpine part of Slovenia) as well as to Kärnten-Carinthia. The second focus is the "litorale" (Küstenland, Primorje), i.e. the administrative unity of Gorizia, Trieste and Istria, under the Habsburgs. The third focus is the metropolitan node of Trieste, whose former mighty radiation and later troubles characterize the whole area.

The cooperation in this area began after the London Memorandum (1954) and the Udine agreement on border traffic (1955). It received a great impulse by the growth of Italian economy and the spread of the automobile, in the early sixties; week-end tourism from the urban centres of Friuli and Trieste began to explore Slovenia and take advantage of the differentials in prices and standards. Italian citizens got the habit of crossing the border daily or weekly for shopping and tanking. Border traffic exploded in correspondence to the auto boom and price differentials in gasoline. A little later, marked improvements in Yugoslav economy caused an inverse inflow for tourism and shopping (mainly durable goods).

The curve of border crossings by Italian citizens shows a marked increase in the years 63-64, a peak in

²¹⁾ D. S. Whytlesley, *The impress of effective central authority upon the landscape*, "Annals of the Association of American Geographers", v. XXV, 1935.

²²⁾ V. v. Malchus, op. cit. (supra, n. 5).

'72-'73, and a precipitous plunge in '73-'75, due to the energy and economic crises following the Yom Kippur war. The border crossings of Yugoslav citizens were more numerous up to the early sixties, when the Italian ones suddenly outnumbered them by two to one; but kept steadily growing in the sixties, until in 1973 they surpassed the Italian ones. Such vicissitudes essentially reflect the spread of automobiles and the trends in the price differentials of the key products and, in general, of the cycles of the two economies.²³⁾ (fig. 8)

The economy of Friuli-Venezia Giulia is more internationally-oriented than the Italian average; 18.4% (40% in Friuli) of its industrial products are exported, as against a national average of 16.1. In 1973 40% of international trade of Friuli-Venezia Giulia was carried on with the neighboring countries – Yugoslavia, Austria, Western Germany. Such economic relationships prompted the blooming of several international and interregional fairs, in each of the provincial capitals, and other forms of economic cooperation. One of the most characteristic of such fairs is the Alpe Adria Fair, that takes places in turn in the different regional capitals of the area.²⁴⁾

Increased exchanges and political detente interacted also at the local level, leading to a veritable frenzy of symbolic exchanges. A pilot study of such events²⁵⁾ showed a fivefold increase, from 77 in 1956 to 449 in 1970; they were distinguished in a) cultural meetings, b) sport events, c) informational meetings between officials of the several levels of public administration, d) recreational meetings, e) political and mixed cultural events, f) meetings of informational and decisional nature, g) mixed, and h) others. Due to the character of the source, the daily of the Slovene minority, *Primorsky Dnevnik*, most reported events concern the contacts between the Slovene minority in Friuli-Venezia Giulia and their co-ethnics in Slovenia. A new study, in progress at the ISIG, will use a variety of sources for a longer time period. More than 850 events have been recorded in 1977.

Among such contacts, the more important ones are between local authorities at the regional (for Friuli-Venezia Giulia), Land (for Kärnten) and Republic (for Slovenia) level, and those of the bi-national commissions set up to regulate border problems. These range from cooperation in the cultural realm to the promotion of border commerce.

One of the main areas of trans-frontier cooperation, however, deals with the harmonization of development plans and the building of infrastructural networks. As in the rest of European border regions, physical planners are among the most energetic promoters of transfrontier cooperation. Planning is essentially an activity of co-ordinating and harmonising different interests; but

the matching of plans of frontier regions is particularly difficult because of the lack of a common institutional framework. The State provides a higher level at which several regional plans are co-ordinated (when they are not directly the result of a "a posteriori" regionalization of a ready-made national plan) but frontier regions are unique in that their plans have to be matched with counterparts belonging to another State.

Fig. 8: Border traffic (cars, buses and trucks) at main crossings

Grenzverkehr (Pkw, Bus, Lkw) an wichtigen Grenzübergängen



Translation of the text in fig. 8: Übersetzung:

Legend		
entrata	= incoming traffic	= Verkehr ins Inland
uscita	= outgoing traffic	= Verkehr ins Ausland

Planning schemes cannot stop at national frontiers, since all major factors – the transportation network, environmental conservation, growth poles – have supra-regional interdependencies; they must be seen in a wider context. But this basic requirement of realistic and effective planning clashes with the lack of institutional machinery, with the consequence that plans of frontier regions often end on a blank "terra incognita".

²³⁾ C. Sambri, *Una frontiera aperta, indagini ai valichi italo-yugoslavi*, Forni, Bologna 1970.

²⁴⁾ E. Vršaj, *La cooperazione economica Alpe Adria*, Mladika, Trieste 1975.

²⁵⁾ E. Sussi, *L'emergenza della regione transfrontaliera Alpe-Adria: transazioni pubbliche tra Carinzia, Croazia, Friuli-Venezia Giulia e Slovenia*, in R. Strassoldo (ed.), *Boundaries and regions*, op. cit. (supra, n. 5).

The early recognition of such absurdity has led to the establishment, first of private, informal contacts among planners of the three or four regions of the area (Trigon) and then (1969) of an official commission, at the highest regional level ("Quadrignon"). The purpose of this commission was to exchange information on planning activities and the eventual publication of a multi-lingual study extended to the whole transfrontier area. This initial task was accomplished in 1975 after 11 major meetings and about 20 smaller ones. The Alpe Adria commission is continuing its work, on more concrete and ad-hoc projects. The next one will be a map of the tourist and recreational resources in the Alpe-Adria region.

One final note regards the problem of frontier commuters, so widespread in other borders. The hiring of foreign citizens is severely curtailed in Friuli-Venezia Giulia, as in all Italy; but there are a few thousands Slovenes working this side of the border, mainly in the urban service sector; there is also a number of illegal workers in the construction industry and some in agriculture. Estimates range from an official 400-650 to an unofficial

15.000 figure.²⁶⁾ In any case, frontier commuters are not the most prominent feature of this border area.


3. The problem of infrastructures and development

The idea of the "bridge region" certainly stresses a mediating and connecting function in the psychological and cultural realms; but, first and foremost, it means the development of physical channels for the flows of people and goods; i. e. roads, railroads, harbor facilities, dockyards, tunnels, canals, truck stations, etc. (Fig. 9). This is the task that the Italian National Plan assigns Friuli-Venezia Giulia, especially in view of enlarged exchanges with Central and South-Eastern Europe. Trieste was well-connected with Central Europe by rail in her old days; but after the severing of those lifelines, she had to reroute much of her traffic to the one-track, low and tortuous Pontebbana railroad, through Gorizia, Udine and Tarvis. Likewise, the line connecting her with Venice and the Italian system was one-track and non-electrified. By road it was connected to the rest of Italy only by the narrow SS (State highway) 14. In the early '60s, the construction of an "autostrada" was undertaken, and the railroad with Venice substantially improved; but the Pontebbana problem remained unsolved, and causes many difficulties to the Trieste traffic, because of the frequent interruptions and usual overload. Trieste's awkward geographical position exposes her to two dangers: the competition of the Yugoslav harbors of Koper and Rijeka - which tend to drain all Yugoslav and most Central European traffic; and the competition of Gorizia for the land traffic and the junction between the Italian highway system and the budding Yugoslav one. Trieste has long fought to become the terminal of the Slovenian trunk line, which has instead (of course) gone to Capodistria, and has prevented Gorizia from being linked with a standard "autostrada"; moreover a head-to-head competition was started between Trieste and Gorizia for the construction of large truck stations at the border passes. Trieste has inaugurated its own on June 4th, 1978; but the Gorizia one will be built as well (a third, lesser one has been in operation at the Coccau pass with Austria for a couple of years).

Another infrastructural problem for Trieste concerns the improvement of connections with industrialized Bavaria. This region has strong interest in better route to the upper Adriatic, but so far the projects to build a new highway through the Dolomite area to Venice have met strong opposition. Trieste and Friuli are offering more eastward connection, through the Plöcken pass (Monte Croce), to be pierced by a tunnel; but also Yugoslavia is interested in attracting the southern German traffic, and in partnership with Austria is going to pierce the Karawanken range. The moratorium on tunnels and highways, enforced in Italy since the early '70s, seemed to have definitely buried Trieste's chances; but the Friulian earthquake of 1976 came to

Fig. 9: Main infrastructures in Friuli-Venezia Giulia

Wichtige Infrastruktur-Einrichtungen in Friaul-Venezia Giulia



Translation of the text in fig. 9:

Autoporto = truck station
 Scalo F.S. = freight yard
 Autostrada = superhighways
 Strade = highways
 Ferrovie = railways
 Porti = harbors
 Aereoporti = airports
 Metanodotto-oleodotto = oil

Übersetzung:

Bushalt
 Frachumschlagplatz
 Autobahnen
 Schnellstraßen
 Eisenbahn
 Häfen
 Flugplätze
 Überland-Rohrleitung
 (Erdgas, Rohöl)

²⁶⁾ P. Nodari, C. Donato, *L'immigrazione di manodopera jugoslava Italia* (mimeo) 1978.

her rescue. The reconstruction programs provide for the solution of all of Trieste's old transport problems: the Pontebbana railroad will be modernized, and a highway built along it to link up with the Austrian system: a branch will depart and go under the Plöcken pass, pointing to Munich.

Another important item in the development of the transport network of Friuli-Venezia Giulia will be the large freight yard at Cervignano, in a baricentric position to the main nodes of Udine, Gorizia and Trieste. This infrastructure, of projected 400 ha and at a cost of 235 Million US \$, will centralize the handling of most rail freight traffic presently handed in the badly overloaded urban stations and in the border nodes of Prosecco (Trieste) and Pontebba-Tarvisio. It will certainly be a mighty pillar of the bridge-region.

Trieste, as the northernmost port of the Mediterranean, has also become the terminal for the oil-pipeline reaching to Ingolstadt; while the gasoline of its own refinery will shortly be pumped to a "benzinodotto" in the Palmanova highway node, wherefrom the gasoline will be loaded on tank trucks. The region is also crossed by a gas pipeline coming from Russia and was a candidate for a terminal for the "re-gassification" of natural gas transported from Algeria on gas carrier ships.

Finally, several plans have been suggested for the construction of inland water transportation. One suggested the excavation of a huge canal from Monfalcone to the Tagliamento, across the Friulian floodplains, to overcome the space limitation of the Trieste harbor. The second, even more ambitious, proposes the construction of a canal along the Isonzo valley, climbing it and passing through the Alpine range by a tunnel, and eventually linking up with the Sava and the Danube inland navigation system. While the first project seems to have been shelved, the second one has found a place in the Osimo agreement, which expressly provides for a serious feasibility study. The significance of such a waterwork in implementing Friuli-Venezia Giulia ambitions as a bridge region, linking Italy to Eastern Europe, is clearly enormous; so are, however, the financial, economic, and perhaps ecological costs of the project.

More concrete, and no less spectacular, is another pro-

vision of the Osimo Agreement, devised in order to give a decisive thrust to the stagnating Trieste economy. We refer to the Industrial Free Zone to be built across the border, in the Karst plateau over Trieste, and to be jointly administered by a Yugoslavo-Italian board. It is a very imaginative and very large project, which sets aside for industrial development an area of 24 square kilometres; when fully in operation, it would offer 15–30.000 new jobs, and would increase by perhaps 100.000 the population of the area. The projected costs are 2860 Millionen US \$; other 318 Millionen US \$ have been appropriated for the development of highway trunks connecting it with the harbor, three hundred meters below.

The scale of the project, the secrecy by which it was shrouded and the suddenness by which it was imposed on Trieste, the social, ethnic, and ecological implications, have all raised a veritable hell in the city and in the whole region. It has been seen in turn as a scheme of multinational capitalist enterprises to penetrate Yugoslavia and exploit her cheaper labor, or as a Yugoslav breach into the EEC; Friuli reacted with uneasiness, fearful that the project would overheat the local economic system, syphon off manpower, and allow stiff competition from Yugoslav enterprises. Trieste people were appalled by the imposition, and by the prospect of a large industrial settlement on their much beloved Karst landscape; some stressed the perils of ecological degradation, and others of "ethnic pollution". Local opposition to the project grew strong in the most diverse circles, from young ecologists to old nationalists, from business circles to threatened Slovene landowners. A rally gathered 60.000 signatures against the Zone (in a city of 270.000). But local protest was of no avail against decisions long taken in Rome and Belgrade. Alternative proposals to dilute the huge zone in a serie of smaller ones, in more opportune locations along the whole of the Italian-Yugoslav border, and especially in the plain of Gorizia-Vipacco, were not even considered. The institutional machinery for the implementation of this item of the Osimo treaty set slowly to work. The impression is that the Free Zone will indeed be built on the designated area, but in a more modest size and with less spectacular consequences.

Zusammenfassung

Ziel des Berichts ist es, eine möglichst vollständige Übersicht über die gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse einer im allgemeinen nur wenig bekannten Region zu geben, nämlich der Region Friaul-Venezia Giulia und der Stadt Triest (Karte des heutigen Standes: Fig. 5, o. S. 148).

Im Verlauf einer sehr ausführlichen geschichtlichen Darstellung wird u. a. darauf aufmerksam gemacht, daß der moderne Ausdruck „Venezia Giulia“ erst knapp 120 Jahre alt ist. Man kann nicht sagen, daß es sich bei der heutigen Region Friaul-Venezia Giulia um ein soziologisch homogenes Gebiet handelt; Friaul ist ein Binnenland, Triest ein Hafen; Friaul war die längste Zeit ausschließlich bäuerlich, Triest ist eine große, selbstbewußte Stadt; Friaul war die längste Zeit sowohl militärisch als auch wirtschaftlich eine Grenz- und Randzone, Triest

ist ein Schnittpunkt vielerlei Wirtschaftswege, sehr weltoffen und rasch wachsend; Friaul hat eine lange und spröde Geschichte, die das dort lebende Volkstum eng mit der Heimat verbunden hat, Triest wirkt demgegenüber als „neureicher“ Emporkömmling mit einer multiethnischen, noch heute kaum assimilierten Bevölkerung. Die Stadt bedarf ihres friaulischen Hinterlandes vor allem wegen der technischen und infrastrukturellen Verbindung mit dem italienischen Staatshoheitsgebiet, ein entsprechendes Bedürfnis auf Seiten Friauls besteht naturgemäß viel weniger oder gar nicht.

Die Beziehungen zwischen Friaul und Triest sind durch die Schwierigkeit der sprachlichen Verständigung gekennzeichnet; das Friaulische, eng mit dem Ladinischen verwandt, wird von den italienischsprachigen Triestern nicht ohne weiteres

verstanden. Es bestehen Bestrebungen, dem Friaulischen eine gesicherte Rechtsstellung in Schule und amtlichem Verkehr zu verschaffen. Ob dies gelingen wird, bleibt abzuwarten. Wichtig ist das Vorhandensein einer dritten Sprachgruppe, der Slowenen. Sie sind allerdings in sich gespalten; es gibt eine jugoslawisch orientierte und eine kirchlich gebundene und dem jugoslawischen Staats- und Gesellschaftsideal abgeneigte Gruppe unter ihnen. Die Slowenen besitzen indessen eigene Schulen und andere kulturelle Einrichtungen, die der italienische Staat duldet und fördert.

Zwischen den verschiedenen Volksgruppen und -stämmen

bestehen im allgemeinen keine Spannungen. Umfragen haben allerdings gezeigt, daß man sich gegenseitig nicht allzuoft privat trifft und auch geschäftlich selten in Beziehung tritt. Ebenso sind die Beziehungen über die jugoslawische Grenze hinweg zwar klaglos, nicht aber eng.

In gewissen Kreisen verspricht man sich insoweit viel von der Errichtung einer gemeinsamen italienisch-jugoslawischen Zollfreizone, doch stößt dieses Projekt wegen seiner enormen Dimensionen und Kosten und auch wegen seiner möglichen Folgen für Demographie und Umwelt auf den Widerstand sowohl in friaulischen als auch in Triestiner Kreisen.